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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN C. DAVIS,

:

Plaintiff and Appellant

:

vs.

:

LEE RITTER, SUSAN RITTER AND

:

DARWIN C. FISHER

:

Defendants and Appellees.

Case No 99-0060

Priority No. 15

:

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992 as amended). The matter was appropriately
poured over to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated
78-2-2(4) (1992 as amended): U.C. A. 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992 as amended).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court error in its finding that a valid assignment of the cause of

action did not exist prior to the filing of the initial complaint. This issue is a question of
fact and therefore the standard of review is that the trial court's factual findings are
reversed only if clearly erroneous. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389,
1392, (Utah 1996) (Citing Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah
1990).

2.

Did the Trial Court error in its finding that neither the Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis,

nor LeRoy W. Townsend was a proper party in interest in this cause of action and, as a
result, an assignment from LeRoy W. Townsend to Steven C. Davis could not give
Steven C. Davis standing in this cause of action. This issue is a question of fact and
therefore, the standard of review is that the trial court's factual findings are reversed only
if clearly erroneous. Id.
3.

Did the Trial Court error in dismissing the cause of action pursuant to Rule 17(a)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure without giving the Plaintiff time to substitute a real
party in interest. This issue is a question of law and therefore, the standard of review is
the trial court's findings are reviewed for correctness. Id. The Plaintiff did not preserve
this issue for appeal in the Trial Court record.
4.

Did the Trial Court error in not granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This issue is a question of law
and therefore the standard of review is that of review for correctness. Id. See also Higgins
v. Salt Lake County 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). The Plaintiff did not preserve this
issue for appeal in the Trial Court record.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The determinative law in this appeal is Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which reads as follows:
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute
may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose

benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for
the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of
Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been
allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by,
or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification,
joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been
commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. LeRoy Townsend Sr., as trustee of the Townsend Family Trust, invested
$250,000.00 so that the Defendants, Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter and the Townsend
Family Trust could start a multi-level, aloe vera business. (R 421-422) (See Transcript
page 6, line 4-12, pagel7, line 19-29, page 18, line 1-24) (Plaintiffs Memorandum
Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 8-11). The company was started,
software and hardware were purchased, inventory was purchased, employees were hired
and the company started business. (See Transcript page 18, line 3-10). Over a period of
time, the company ran out of funds and was closed. (See Transcript page 18, line 3-24).
Mr. Townsend Sr. assigned his rights, in this cause of action, to the Plaintiff, Steven C.
Davis. (R 363-365). Mr. Davis brought this cause of action to recover the $250,000.00
paid by the Townsend Family Trust. (R 1-7).
A Complaint was filed on August 13, 1993 by the Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis,
against the Defendants, Lee Ritter, Susan Ritter and Darwin C. Fisher. (R i-7). A
Default Judgment was entered on January 4, 1994, (R 25-26) and Set Aside on February
25, 1994. (R 53-54). Various court proceedings ensued (R 55-120) and an Answer was
filed on September 17, 1997. (R 121-124). On December 7, 1998, this matter came up

for hearing before the Honorable Judge Gary D. Stott on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment against the Defendants Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter and on Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss. (R 409-410).
The Trial Court found that neither Steven C. Davis nor LeRoy W. Townsend Sr.
was the proper party in interest in this cause of action and that at the time the cause of
action was filed, a valid assignment of the cause of action did not exist. As a result, the
Trial Court dismissed the cause of action without prejudice and did not rule on the
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement. (R 452-453).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In December of 1991, Mr. LeRoy Townsend, Sr., as trustee of the Townsend
Family Trust, agree to invest $250,000.00 in a venture to form a multi-level, aloe vera,
business with the Defendants, Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter. (R 421-422) (See Transcript
page 6, line 4-12, pagel7, line 19-29, page 18, line 1-24) (Plaintiffs Memorandum
Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 8-11). Mr. Townsend, as trustee of
the Townsend Family Trust, gave Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter a check, from the
Townsend Family Trust, in exchange for 40 percent ownership of the new venture.
(Plaintiffs Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 8-11). Mr.
Townsend received a stock certificate, made out in the name of the Townsend Family
Trust, evidencing the trust's ownership in the new venture. (Plaintiffs Memorandum
Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 10). The new venture was
unsuccessful and, after a short period of time, it was closed. (Transcript page 19, line 124). On August 13, 1993, the Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis, filed a Complaint against Lee

Ritter, Susan Ritter and Darwin Fisher. The complaint ask for, among other things, the
return of the $250,000.00 invested in the venture by the Townsend Family Trust. (R 1-7).
On August 30, 1993, Mr. Townsend Sr. assigned his personal rights in his cause of action
against Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter to Steven Davis. In exchange, Mr. Townsend was to
receive one-half of the proceeds recovered from the causes of action entered into against
Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter on his behalf. (R 363-365). After various legal arguments,
(R 55-120) an answer was filed on September 17, 1997. (R 121-124). The Plaintiff file a
Motion for Summary Judgment, (R 193-194) and the Defendant filed a Motion to
Dismiss, (R 362) both of which came before the Honorable Judge Gary D. Stott for oral
argument on December 7, 1998. (R 409-410). The Trial Court found that at the time the
Complaint was filed, Steven Davis did not have a valid assignment. (R 452-453). The
Trial Court also found that even if Mr. Davis did have a valid assignment at the time the
Complaint was filed, the assignment was from Mr. Townsend personally and not the
Townsend Family Trust. (R 452-453). As a result of the Trial Courts findings of fact, the
Trial Court dismissed the cause of action without prejudice. Since the Trial Court
dismissed the cause of action, the Trial Court did not rule on Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgement. (R 452-453).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court found the assignment LeRoy Townsend gave to Steven Davis
assigning all of LeRoy Townsend's rights in a cause of action against Lee Ritter and
Susan Ritter did not exist at the time Steven Davis filed his Complaint against Lee Ritter
and Susan Ritter. (R 410, 452-453). As a result, Steven Davis was not the real party in

interest. This findings of fact are supported by the evidence presented and are not
clearly erroneous.
The Trial Court also found that even if the assignment LeRoy Townsend gave to
Steven Davis assigning all of LeRoy Townsend's rights in a cause of action against Lee
Ritter and Susan Ritter did exist at the time Steven Davis filed his Complaint, LeRoy
Townsend Sr. would not have been the real party in interest in this cause of action and
therefore neither was Steven Davis. (R 410, 452-453). Again the Trial Court's findings
of fact are supported by the evidence presented and are not clearly erroneous.
Based on the Trial Courts finding of fact, and Utah case law, the Trial Court was
correct in dismissing the cause of action pursuant to rule 17(a) without allowing the
Plaintiff time to amend his complaint or introduce additional evidence.
The Trial Court did not rule on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
because the Trial Courts decision to dismiss the cause of action made the Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment moot. However, the Trial Court did say that if it were to
rule on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, it would have ruled against the
Plaintiff. (Transcript page 22, line 16-24). The Trial Court's refusal to rule on the
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was correct and its finding that if it were to
rule on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment that it would have ruled against the
Plaintiff was also correct.
ARGUMENT
1.

Did the Trial Court error in its finding that a valid assignment of the cause of

action did not exist prior to the filing of the initial complaint

The evidence, which was before the Trial Court, clearly shows that there was not
a valid assignment of the cause of action prior to the filing of the initial complaint. The
Plaintiffs complaint was filed on August 13, 1993. (R 1-7). An Assignment of Right of
Action was executed and signed by Mr. LeRoy Townsend on August 30, 1993 and
accepted by Mr. Steven C. Davis on August 31, 1993. (R 411-413). This assignment
assigned all of Mr. Townsend's,
.. .rights, title, interest, claims and demands, in and to any and all causes of
action against Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter which have arisen out of the
procurement of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00) by Lee
Ritter and Susan Ritter.... (R 413)
As was argued at the Trial Court Hearing, the language of this Assignment of Right of
Action clearly indicated that it is an assignment of rights which will take effect upon its
signing and not a written verification of a prior verbal assignment. (Transcript page 12,
line 24-25, page 13, 1-18). The Assignment of Right of Action uses language such as,
.. .LeRoy Townsend (hereinafter assignor), hereby assigns all of his rights,
title, and interest ...","•• .Assignee, Steven Davis, will have full place
instead of assignor.. .1, Steven C. Davis, assignee, accept the above
Assignment.... (Emphasis added)(R411-413)
As you can see, the language of the assignment is clearly meant to assign a future interest
and not to ratify a previous verbal agreement. Nowhere in the assignment is there a
reference to a prior verbal agreement.
The fact that the Plaintiff later received a valid assignment from Mr. Townsend
does not relate back to the time the complaint was filed. As a result, the Plaintiff was not
the "real party in interest." 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments Section 129 (1963) states in part,

When an unauthorized assignment of a cause of action is ratified after suit is
brought, the ratification will not relate back to the date of the assignment and
support the action. See Also Read v. Buffum, 79 Call 77, 21 P 555.
Plaintiff, when ask by the Trial Court for evidence of a verbal agreement offered
the Affidavit of Steven C. Davis and the Affidavit of Richard C. Coxson (Transcript page
19, line 13- 25, page 1-25). A close examination of both of these affidavits shows no
evidence whatsoever that a verbal assignment existed at the time the complaint was filed.
(Plaintiffs Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 18) (R
106-107) The Affidavit of Mr. Steven C. Davis states:
2. Before August 13, 1993 I was present with attorney Richard C. Coxson
when LeRoy Townsend retained the legal services of Richard C. Coxson,
via telephone conversations. The terms and conditions were verbally
agreed to between all parties before August 13, 1993. Mr. Townsend
requested Mr. Coxson to proceed immediately"
"3.
A formal "Assignment of Right of Action" was signed by LeRoy
Townsend in California on the 30th day of August, 1993. My signature was
notarized on this same instrument on the 3rd of September, 1993. I still
have the original document. (R 106-107)
Plaintiff argues that this affidavit establishes that a verbal assignment was made prior to
the filing of the complaint. All this affidavit establishes is that Mr. Townsend retained
the legal services of Richard C. Coxson, that the terms of that representation were agreed
to and that Mr. Coxson was to proceed immediately.
The Affidavit of Mr. Coxson states:
1. I was originally retained in this matter by LeRoy W. Townsend, Sr. and
by Steven C. Davis to represent them and received a retainer fee paid by
Mr. Townsend. I was aware of the agreement and assignment between Mr.
Townsend and Mr. Davis, which was done for consideration. (Plaintiffs
Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 18)

Again Plaintiff argues that this affidavit establishes that a verbal assignment was made
prior to the filing of the complaint. However, once again, all that this affidavit
establishes is that Mr. Coxson was retained for some unknown reason to represent LeRoy
Townsend and Steven C. Davis and that he was aware of an agreement and an assignment
between Mr. Townsend and Mr. Davis. There is no indication whatsoever as to whether
or not there was a verbal assignment. There is also no indication whether or not the
assignment was made before the complaint was filed.
Plaintiff then argues "the actions of the parties demonstrated that there was in fact
a verbal assignment." And that Mr. Coxson would not have filed the complaint if he
wasn't aware of a prior verbal assignment. (Appellant Brief page 17). However, what a
party's counsel says and does must be supported by the evidence and is not evidence in
and of itself. In Butterfield v. Okubo 21 P. 555, 556 (Cal. 1889) the Court states:
.. .The representations of counsel, though entirely credible as far as they go,
are nevertheless not evidence, and therefore do not suffice to establish facts
showing fatal deficiencies...
Plaintiff also argues that equity requires that a verbal assignment be upheld
(Appellants Brief, page 16-18). First of all this is the first time that argument has been
made. It was not to my knowledge made in the record and should therefore not be
considered here. However, if the argument is considered here, this argument ignores that
fact that the Plaintiff has presented no evidence of a verbal assignment and that the Trial
Court found that a verbal assignment did not exist. (R452-453)
Regardless of whether you apply a review standard of clearly erroneous or
reviewed for correctness the Trial Court was correct in its finding that the Plaintiff has

failed to present any credible evidence whatsoever that an assignment existed prior to
the filing of the complaint, and therefore, the Plaintiff was not the real party in interest
and the cause of action should have been dismissed.

2.

Did the Trial Court error in its finding that neither the Plaintiff, Steven C.

Davis, nor LeRoy W. Townsend was a proper party in interest in this cause of action
and, as a result, an assignment from LeRoy W. Townsend to Steven C. Davis could
not give Steven C. Davis standing in this cause of action.

In order for Mr. Davis to be able to bring this cause of action and be considered
the real party in interest, he must have a valid assignment from someone that, except for
the assignment, would have been the real party in interest. In the present case, Mr.
Townsend as trustee of the Townsend Family Trust invested $250,000.00 of trust funds
in a business venture. (R 420-421). As evidence of the trusts investment, the trust
received a stock certificate in the name of the trust (R 421). Mr. Townsend even took the
time to write a letter to Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter in which he states:
Enclosed is our check for $250,000.00 40% of the Voting stock shares in
full in The Ideal Nutritional Concepts Inc. (Incorporated in the state of
Washington) This voting stock to be in the name of LeRoy Willis
Townsend, Trustee for the Living Trust of LeRoy Willis Townsend and
Esther Ruth Townsend recorded Oct 27, 1967 in Los Angeles County State
of California. (Plaintiffs Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exhibit 8).
It is clear from the evidence presented to the Trial Court that the real party in
interest was the trust and that without a valid assignment from the trust, neither Mr.

Townsend nor Mr. Davis can qualify as the real party in interest. The only evidence of
any assignment, is a written assignment in which Mr. Townsend personally assigns any
rights he may have against Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter to Mr. Davis (R 411-413).
However, nothing in that documents indicate that the trust is assigning any of its rights to
anyone. The Complaint itself backs this up when it says: "13. Plaintiff is the assignee of
LeRoy Townsend with regard to this cause of action."(R 3). To allow this cause of action
to continue would be to allow the possibility that the trust at some future date could bring
the same cause of action against Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter. This is exactly the concern
that Rule 17(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, addresses. (See Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d
758 (Utah 1984).
Plaintiff, for the first time in their brief to this Court, argues that the assignment is
valid from the trust itself. As a result, this argument should not be considered. However,
if it is considered, it is not convincing. The Plaintiff argues that case law does not
invalidate a document because it is signed by a trustee who does not so identify himself
as the trustee. (Appellant's brief, page 18-20). To support his argument Plaintiff sites
Pride Exploration v. Marshall Exploration, 798 F. 2d 864, 866 (5th Cir. 1986). However,
this case deal with a completely difference issue. In this case, the document that was
being signed was in all other respects except for the identification of the signer as the
trustee a trust document that referred to the trust. Therefore, the only thing that was not
correct was the fact that the signer did not identify himself as the trustee. As the Plaintiff
quoted in his brief, the Court states:

Surprisingly, we have discovered virtually no case law, including Texas
cases dealing with the question of whether a conveyance properly naming
the grantor and signed by the proper party, is nevertheless invalid because
the signer failed to indicate the capacity in which he signed.
The Court clearly indicates that the documents in all other respects indicated that it was a
document transferring trust interest. In this case, the assignment does not indicate that it
is a transfer of rights of the trust but rather a transfer of Mr. Townsend's personal rights.
(R 411-413) The fact that Mr. Townsend did not sign the assignment as trustee is just
another indication that it was not an assignment from the trust.
Once again, the Trial Court was correct in its determination that even if the
assignment was valid, it was an assignment of Mr. Townsend's personal rights and not an
assignment of the trust's rights. (R 452-453) As a result, Mr. Davis could not be the real
party in interest because, his assignment if considered valid was from Mr. Townsend and
Mr. Townsend was not a real party in interest, the trust was. Whether the standard of
review is clearly erroneous or reviewed for correctness, the Plaintiff presented not
evidence in the record, which would allow the Trial Court to come to any other
conclusion than it did when it found that the trust was the real party in interest and that
the trust had not assigned its rights to anyone. Therefor the cause of action should be
dismissed.

3.

Did the Trial Court error in dismissing the cause of action pursuant to Rule

17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure without giving the Plaintiff time to
substitute a real party in interest.

The Plaintiff made no arguments before the Trial Court with regard to this issue.
The Plaintiff did not file a response to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that address
this issue and did not even raise this issue in the Plaintiffs docketing statement.
Therefore, the Court should not address this argument. However, if the Court does
consider this argument, given the evidence present in the record and the finding of the
Trial Court with regard to that evidence, the Trial Court was correct in dismissing the
cause of action pursuant to Rule 17(a) which in part states:
(a) ... Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express
trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the
benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's
name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and
when a statute so provides an action for the use or benefit of another shall
be brought in the name of the state of Utah....
The uncontradicted evidence that was before the Trial Court clearly indicated, that
the Trial Court was correct in dismissing the cause of action because the cause of action
was not brought by the real party in interest. The Plaintiff, again for the first time in his
brief, argues that the Trial Court abused its discretion by not allowing the Plaintiff to
amend his complaint. (Appellant's Brief page 21-22) First of all, the Court should not
even consider this argument because the plaintiff presents it for the first time in his brief
to this Court. However, if the Court does consider the Plaintiff argument, the Court must
still find that the Trial Court acted correctly. Plaintiff argues that Rule 17(a) Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure requires such action. (Appellant's Brief page 21-22). Rule 17(a) says
in part:

No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder
or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced
in the name of the real party in interest.
Plaintiff argues that the language quoted above applies to this case, (Appellant's
Brief page 20-22). It does not. This Court has ruled that in a case, such as this, where the
plaintiff is not only not the real party in interest but, has no right whatsoever to bring the
cause of action in the first place, that the complaint initiating the cause of action is a
nullity and there is no remaining cause of action in which to substitute parties. In Estate
of Martin Haro v. Maria Guadalupe Haro 887 P.2d 878 (C. App Utah). This Court stated
referring to Rule 17(a)
This rule contemplates that the party bringing suit has the capacity to sue
on behalf of the "real party in interest." If the suit is brought by a party that
does not have the capacity to sue on behalf of the "real party in interest,"
the suit is a nullity.
In this particular case, the Estate of Martin Haro had brought an action under Utah's
wrongful death statute. The defendant brought a motion to dismiss arguing that only an
heir or a personal representative could maintain a wrongful death action in Utah. The
plaintiff then filed a motion to substitute the real party in interest pursuant to Rule 17(a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure. In upholding the Trial Court's determination that
because the "Estate of Martin Haro was not an heir or personal representative it did not
have the capacity to sue and therefore the complaint and in that case the amended
complaint were nullities the Court states:

Section 78-11-7 clearly delineates that the decedent's heirs or his or her
personal representative (on behalf of the heirs) are the only parties that may
maintain an action for wrongful death. Section 78-11-7 does not allow for
the decedent's estate to bring and maintain a wrongful death action. We
therefore conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that the plaintiff
in the present case lacked the necessary capacity to sue.
The Court reasoned that because the Plaintiff lacked the necessary capacity to sue, the
complaint and the amended complaint were a nullity and, as a result, there was nothing to
amend.
The same situation exists here. The only right that the Plaintiff had to bring this
cause of action was his assertion that he had an assignment from someone who had they
brought the cause of action themselves, would have been the real party in interest. The
evidence shows, and the Trial Court found, that this was not the case. As a result, the
Plaintiff "had no capacity to bring an action, the complaint was a nullity and there
remained no cause of action in which to substitute parties."
Plaintiff further argues that Intermountain Physical Medicine Associates, v. Micro-Dex
Corporation, 739 P.2d 1131 supports its position. (Appellant's Brief page 21-22) It does
not. In that case the Trial Court found that:
.. .plaintiff is a partnership made up of three P.C's, not named as parties to
the suit, and that the three general partner-corporations are indispensable
parties....
This Court goes on to state:
The thrust of Utah R. Civ. P. 19 is to require the joinder of persons needed
for just adjudication. Rule 19(a) instructs the trial court to join as a party a
person whose absence will prevent complete relief amount those already
parties. A plain reading of Rules 17(a) and 19(a) reveals that the trial court
should make every effort to insure that the proceeding adjudicates that
rights of those necessary and intended to be before the court

In that case the complaint had been filed by individuals who were proper parties in
interest. The court determined that not all of the parties required were joined and when
the Plaintiff ask for leave to join additional parties the Trial Court refused and dismissed
the case. In this case, the Plaintiff was not the proper party in interest and had no right to
bring this cause of action. Because the Plaintiff was relying on assignments what were
not valid at the time the complaint was filed, he had no rights at all and the complaint was
a nullity. Therefore, the case was properly dismissed. The standard of review with
regard to the Trial Court's dismissal is one of review for correctness. The Trial Court
was clearly correct in its finding that the cause of action should have been dismissed and
that the Plaintiff had no right to addition time to amend his complaint, even if he had
made such a motion which he did not.

4.

Did the Trial Court error in not granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary

Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

First of all, this Court has nothing to review with regard to the issue of Summary
Judgment because the Trial Court did not grant or deny Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Trial Court was correct in not considering Plaintiffs motion for
Summary Judgment because the Trial Court granted Defendants Motion to Dismiss. By
Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was
moot, as the Trial Court indicated. Secondly, if the Court finds that the Trial Court was

wrong in dismissing this cause of action, then this Court should remand this cause of
action back to the Trial Court for further consideration, which might, depending on the
facts and circumstances, include a consideration of the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment. However, if this Court does consider Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, it should not grant it because this case is based completely on factual
situations and it is clear from the record that the real issues in this case are the facts and
the interpretation of those facts. The only things that have happened in this case with
regard to the determination of factual issues are that the Plaintiff filed a complaint. The
Defendant answered that complaint by denying most if not all of the factual allegations.
The Plaintiff sent out Interrogatories, which the Defendant answered. However, those
Interrogatories do not resolve any, much less all of the outstanding issues of fact. In
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff simply alleges facts that are still
in dispute, draws unsupported conclusions from those facts and then asks the Trial Court
to find that there are no factual issues in dispute. That is simply not true. In order for the
Court to find in favor of the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must
view the facts in the light most favorable to the non moving party, in this case the
Defendant and then the Court must find that there are no material issues of fact in
dispute. That is simply not the case here and the Court should deny the Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Trial Court rightfully found that the evidence presented clearly
showed that there was no verbal assignment at the time that the complaint was filed. The

Trial Court further found that although there was a written assignment made after the
complaint was filed, it was an assignment of Mr. Townsend's personal rights and not an
assignment of the Townsend Family Trust's rights. Since the Townsend Family Trust
was the only real party in interest in this case, neither Mr. Townsend nor Mr. Davis was a
real parties in interest. Therefore, even if Mr. Townsend made a verbal assignment to
Mr. Davis it would not have made Mr. Davis the real party in interest in this case. And
even if there were a verbal assignment prior to the written assignment and prior to the
filing of the complaint, it would not and did not make Mr. Davis a real party in interest.
Because Mr. Davis was not a real party in interest and because he had no right to bring
this cause of action against Lee Ritter and Susan Ritter the complaint was a nullity and
should have been dismissed without giving the Plaintiff additional time to amend.
The Trial Court did not rule on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
because he dismissed the case pursuant to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss which
made the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment moot. The Trial Court was correct in
its actions.
The Trial Court was correct when it dismissed the cause of actions and did not
consider the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore Appellees respectfully
request this Court to affirm the deceision of the District Court.
Dated this 4th day of December, 1999.

Attorney for Appellees
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ADDENDUM

Albert John BUTTERFIELD and Angela
Butterfield, on Behalf of Tiffany Ruth
BUTTERFIELD, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
David OKUBO, Thomas Nickol, and Holy
Cross Jordan Valley Hospital, Defendant
and Respondents.
No. 880347-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 28, 1990.
In medical malpractice action, the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Richard H.
Moffat, J., dismissed action on motion for
summary judgment, and appeal was taken.
The Court of Appeals, John Farr Larson,
Senior Juvenile Judge, held that: (1) affidavit
in opposition to motion for summary
judgment was admissible, and (2) there was
insufficient evidence of proximate causation.
Affirmed.
[1] JUDGMENT kl85.1(l)
228kl85.1(l)
Certificate attesting to proper service of
affidavit in opposition to motion for summary
judgment was to be taken at face value, and
unsworn verbal representations of movant's
counsel
about
defects
in
service,
representations based in part on hearsay
conversations with their office personnel, did
not suffice to establish facts showing fatal
deficiencies in service of affidavit. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
There was no evidence establishing causal
link between physicians' treatment of infant
and her death of sudden infant death
syndrome.
[6] TORTS kl5

[2] PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
kl8.80(8)
299kl 8.80(8)
Ordinarily, expert medical testimony must be
presented in order to establish standard of care
by which doctor's conduct is to be measured
and that patient's injury was proximately
caused by conduct of doctor that fell below
that standard;
furthermore, the expert
testimony, like the standard of care which is
its subject matter, is specific to the particular
medical specialty or area of expertise of
defendant.
[3] EVIDENCE k538
157k538
One physician is not qualified to give
admissible opinion on treatment provided by
another physician, unless physician giving the
opinion is shown to have familiarity with
treating physician's particular area of practice.
[4] JUDGMENT kl85.3(21)
228kl85.3(21)
While there was reason to question whether
affiant physician's apparently rather eclectic
background qualified him as an expert in all
three of defendant physicians' fields of
medical practice, his representations of his
competence were not so patently unfounded or
conclusory that his opinion concerning
standard of care could be wholly disregarded
on motion for summary judgment.
[5] PHYSICIANS
kl8.80(5)
299kl 8.80(5)

AND

SURGEONS

379kl5
Element of proximate causation in tort case
inquires into whether defendant could, under
the circumstances, reasonably have foreseen
that harm of which plaintiff complains could
result from defendant's breach of standard of

care.
*94 David Grindstaff (argued), Quintana &
Grindstaff, Attorneys for Appellants Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
David W. Slagle (argued), Snow, Christensen
& Martineau, Salt Lake City, for Holy Cross
Jordan Valley Hosp.
Gary D. Stott, Michael A. Peterson, Curtis
Drake (argued), Richards, Brandt, Miller &
Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Thomas Nickol.
R. Scott Williams (argued), G. Eric Nielson,
Strong & Hanni, Salt Lake City, for David
Okubo.
Before DAVIDSON,
LARSON [FN1], JJ.

JACKSON,

and

FN1. John Fair Larson, Senior
Juvenile Judge, sitting by special
appointment pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1989).
*95 OPINION
JOHN FARR LARSON, Senior Juvenile
Judge:
Albert and Angela Butterfield appeal from a
summary judgment dismissing this action for
wrongful death, which they allege to be due to
medical malpractice by the defendants.
Because of a lack of evidence in the record
concerning proximate cause, we affirm.
After Tiffany's death, the Butterfields sued
Drs. Nickol and Okubo and Holy Cross (but
not Dr. McClellan) for medical malpractice,
filing their complaint on December 15,1986.
On August 25, 1987, the district court held a
scheduling conference, after which an order
issued stating that "All discovery must be
completed, including the filing of
depositions^] by December 11, 1987." On
December 11,1987, the Butterfields moved to

The Butterfields' infant daughter Tiffany died
at home on December 20, 1984 of sudden
infant death syndrome. She was born June 30,
1984. On that day and again on July 16,1984,
Tiffany was examined by Dr. David Okubo, a
pediatrician. On two occasions in July and
August 1984, the Butterfields noted apparent
problems in Tiffany's breathing and took her
to the emergency room of Holy Cross Jordan
Valley Hospital ("Holy Cross"), where she
was examined and treated by Dr. Thomas
Nickol, an emergency room physician and
general practitioner.
Thereafter, the
Butterfields placed Tiffany exclusively in the
care and treatment of Dr. Monty McClellan, a
family practitioner. He examined Tiffany on
five occasions
in August
through
mid-December, 1984.
Following his August 16,1984 examination,
Dr. Nickol recommended close observation of
Tiffany's breathing with attention to possible
cyanosis or blue discoloration. However,
neither Drs. Nickol or Okubo nor Holy Cross
referred the Butterfields to a physician with
more extensive expertise specifically in infant
breathing disorders. They also did not
recommend the use of home apnea monitoring
equipment. The record does not indicate
what, if any, care or treatment was provided
by Dr. McClellan for Tiffany's breathing
problems during the last four months of her
life.

extend the discovery deadline in relation to
Holy Cross, and on December 23, 1987, in
relation to Dr. Nickol. On December 10 and
11, 1987, the defendants filed motions for
summary judgment accompanied by affidavits
stating in essence that the defendants'
treatment of Tiffany had not fallen below the
applicable standard of care and was not the
cause of her death. The court heard those
motions on December 23, 1987.
The

Butterfields had no expert testimony in the
record in their favor until the day before the
summary judgment hearing, when they filed
an affidavit by Dr. H. Barry Jacobs. They
attempted service of the Jacobs affidavit on
opposing counsel that evening and/or the next
day. The copy intended for Dr. Nickol's
counsel was left with a security guard
employed at the office building at which
counsel works, and Dr. Okubo's counsel could
not locate any served copy until after the
summary judgment hearing.
The trial court noted the apparent defects in
service of the Jacobs affidavit, and seems to
have concluded that, with or without the
Jacobs affidavit, the Butterfields had failed to
establish a prima facie case because no
competent expert testimony indicated either a
breach of the standard of care or that the
defendants1 medical treatment proximately
caused the child's death. The principal [FN2]
issues presented are therefore (*96 1) whether
the Jacobs affidavit is entitled to consideration
in ruling on the motion, and (2) whether there
is sufficient evidence in the record to create a
factual issue about whether the defendants
both breached the standard of care applicable
to each and thereby proximately caused
Tiffany's death.
FN2. The Butterfields also argue that
the district court should have granted
their motion to extend the time limit
for completion of discovery. However,
we find no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's scheduling of the case.
See Utah R.Civ.P. 16(b); 3 J. Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice U 16.22 at
16-123 (2d ed. 1989). Moreover,
FN4. Briefly, to recover for medical
malpractice, the plaintiff must show
that he or she suffered an injury that
was actually and proximately caused
by an act or omission of the medical
professional that fell below the

since the case was properly dismissed
on summary judgment, additional time
for discovery would serve no purpose.
The Butterfields were not entitled to
delay the summary judgment because
they failed to proceed under Utah R.
Civ.P. 56(f). See Cox v. Winters, 678
P.2d311,314 (Utah 1984); Reeves v.
Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d
636, 639 (Utah Ct.App.1988);
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman,
740 P.2d 275,278-79 (Utah Ct.1987).
Service of the Jacobs Affidavit
As courts have often noted, a party opposing
a motion for summary judgment that is
supported by affidavits and/or other
evidentiary materials "may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or ... otherwise ...
must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him." [FN3] In this
case, therefore, the Butterfields had to
introduce evidence supporting those elements
[FN4] of their case that had been effectively
challenged by the defendants in moving for
summary judgment. A major part of the
Butterfields' evidence was the Jacobs
affidavit.
FN3. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e); Busch
Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987);
Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev.
Co., 659 P.2d 1040,1044 (Utah 1983).

standard of care for that professional's
medical field or specialty.
See
Robinson v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah
App.1987);
Hoopiiana
v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740

P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987).
The defendants argue that the Jacobs affidavit
should not be considered because it was not
properly
served
on their
counsel.
Axiomatically, an affidavit in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment must not
merely be filed with the court; it must also be
served on opposing counsel no later than the
day before the hearing on the motion, [FN5]
to allow them an opportunity to prepare for
the hearing. We have previously noted that an
affidavit that has not been properly served
should not be considered, and the motion may
be resolved without it. P & B Land, Inc. v.
Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274, 277 (Utah
App.1988).
FN5. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c).
[1] In this case, however, the facts relating to
the lack of service were not suitably
established.
The Jacobs affidavit was
accompanied by a certificate attesting to
proper service. The only evidence to the
contrary in the record is the unsworn verbal
representations of counsel about the defects in
service, representations based in part on
hearsay conversations with their office
personnel. While we have no reason to
question the accuracy of counsel's
representations, the Jacobs affidavit was
nevertheless the principal feature of the
Butterfields' opposition to the potentially
dispositive motions for summary judgment.
The certificate of service is entitled to be
taken at face value, unless admissible
FN6. An exception is made where the
physician's error is so plain and simple
that it is within the range of ordinary
lay knowledge. For example, in
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348
(Utah 1980), a surgeon left a surgical
cutting needle inside the plaintiffs
body, and the court held that expert
testimony on the standard of care was

evidence shows it to be erroneous. The
representations of counsel, though entirely
credible as far as they go, are nevertheless not
evidence, and therefore do not suffice to
establish facts showing fatal deficiencies in
the service of the Jacobs affidavit. We
therefore consider the Jacobs affidavit in
determining whether the Butterfields came
forward with sufficient evidence to warrant
denial of summary judgment.
Standard of Care
[2][3] Due to the technical and complex
nature of a medical doctor's services, expert
medical testimony must ordinarily [FN6] be
presented in order to establish the standard of
care by which the doctor's conduct is to be
measured and that the injury was proximately
*97 caused by conduct of the doctor that fell
below that standard of care. Anderson v.
Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216, 220
(1943); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817,
821-22 (Utah App.1988); Martin v. Mott, 744
P.2d 337, 338 (Utah App. 1987); Robinson v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d
262, 264 (Utah App. 1987). Further, the
expert testimony, like the standard of care
which is its subject matter, is specific to the
particular medical specialty or area of
expertise of the defendant. In other words,
one physician is not qualified to give an
admissible opinion on the treatment provided
by another physician, unless the physician
giving the opinion is shown to have
familiarity with the treating physician's
particular area of practice. [FN7]
not needed, in essence because
everybody knows that a surgeon
should not leave inside a sharp,
foreign object used to make the
incision.
In this case, however,
whether the defendants should have
taken additional steps to prevent future
apnea is a factual question not within
the range of ordinary lay knowledge.

FN7. Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d
245, 247-48 (Utah 1985); see also
Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 822.
[4] The expert affidavits submitted by the
defendants in moving for summary judgment
indicate both that the attesting expert was
qualified to render an opinion on the standard
of care applicable to the particular defendant
about which he was speaking, and that the
defendant's treatment of Tiffany did not fall
below that standard. The question thus
becomes whether Dr. Jacobs also indicated
familiarity with the standards of care
applicable to the defendants sufficient to
warrant consideration of his opinion. In that
regard, Dr. Jacobs stated:
1.1 am a physician licensed in the State of
Maryland and am a Board Certified Surgeon
since 1974. I have past experience in
Emergency Room care at four hospitals, and
Pediatrics, having cared for patients in
private practice and hospitals, including the
Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C.
3.1 am familiar with the Standard of Care,
applicable in 1984, required in pediatrics
and emergency room medicine, as well as
hospital responsibility for adequate record
keeping and availability of previous records
during later follow up care for a related
complaint.
Based on those statements, there is reason to
question whether Dr. Jacobs' apparently rather
[5] However, while Dr. Jacobs' criticizes the
defendants' treatment of Tiffany, he does not
establish the requisite causal link between that
treatment and Tiffany's death. Dr. Jacobs
opines that the defendants' failure to prescribe
home monitoring of Tiffany's breathing, and
perhaps also a more generalized inattention to
Tiffany's breathing problems, constitute
treatment falling below the standard of care.
However, those asserted errors occurred in
mid-1984, whereas Tiffany died on December

eclectic background qualifies him as an expert
in all three of the defendants' fields of medical
practice. However, our role is not to
cross-examine the affidavit by conjecture;
[FN8] rather, we take it at face value, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Butterfields, since they lost the summary
judgment motions in the court below. [FN9]
In that light, Dr. Jacobs' representations of his
competence are not so patently unfounded or
conclusory that they can be wholly
disregarded. Because Dr. Jacobs' opinion
concerning the standard of care contradicts
those of the defendants' experts, it
demonstrates the existence of a dispute of
material fact, which precludes summary
judgment on the question of the standard of
care.
FN8. See Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639 ("In
considering a motion for summary
judgment, it is not appropriate for a
court to weigh the evidence or assess
credibility[.])"
FN9. Branam v. Provo School Dist.,
780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989); Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d
634, 636 (Utah 1989); Atlas Corp. v.
Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 299
(Utah 1987).
Proximate Causation

19, 1984, four months after she had been
placed in the care of another medical
practitioner. The defendants argue that these
facts, along with expert opinion, indicate that
their treatment of Tiffany did not proximately
cause her death. Dr. Jacobs, however, ignores
the causation question.
[6] The element of proximate causation in a
tort case inquires into whether the *98
defendant could, under the circumstances,

reasonably have foreseen that the harm of
which the plaintiff complains would result
from the defendant's breach of the standard of
care. See Jackson v. Hicks, 738 P.2d 1037,
1039 (Utah 1987); Mitchell v. Pearson
Enters., Inc., 697 P.2d 240, 245-47 (Utah
1985); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723,
728-29 (Utah 1985). Without proof of
proximate cause, the plaintiff cannot recover
in tort. Dowell Div. of Dow Chemical U.S.A.
v. Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc., 761 P.2d
1380,1384 (Utah 1988); Bennionv.LeGrand
Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078,1082-83
(Utah 1985).
When proximate causation was called into
question by the defendants in moving for
summary judgment, it was incumbent on the
Butterfields to come forward with evidence of
a causal link between the purported
malpractice and the harm for which they seek
damages. [FN10] However, there is nothing
in the Jacobs affidavit to indicate that the
defendants' medical treatment proximately
caused Tiffany's death, or even caused her
death at all. From the record, we cannot
exclude the possibility that the defendants
may have erred, but fortuitously, their error
was not a cause, or a substantial enough cause,
of Tiffany's death. [FNll] The allegation of
causation, a critical element of the
Butterfields' prima facie case, thus remains
unsubstantiated.
FN10. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414,
415-16 (Utah 1990).
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Estate of Martin Haro, Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Maria Guadalupe Haro and Everardo Haro, Defendants and
Appellees
No. 930702-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
887 P.2d 878,254 Utah Adv. Rep. 19
December 20,1994, Filed
Second District, Davis County. The Honorable W. Brent West.
COUNSEL
Scott Holt, Layton, for Appellant.
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J. Kent Holland, Salt Lake City, for Appellee Everardo Haro.
JUDGES
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Wilkins. WE CONCUR: Judith M. Billings, Judge, Michael J.
Wilkins, Judge
AUTHOR: BENCH
OPINION

BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiff estate appealsfromthe trial court's dismissal of its wrongful death action. We affirm.
FACTS
On February 24, 1991, Martin Haro died as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning he had
sustained while staying in the home of his ex-wife, Maria Haro. On January 12, 1993, plaintiff
brought a wrongful death action against Maria Haro and Juan Haro, claiming that their negligence
caused Martin Haro's injuries and eventual death. On February 26, 1993, plaintiff filed an
amended complaint naming Maria Haro and Everardo Haro as defendants.
Defendants brought a motion to dismiss plaintiffs amended complaint on the ground that
Martin Haro's estate was neither an heir nor his personal representative and therefore could not
maintain an action under Utah's wrongful death statute. Plaintiff then brought a motion to
substitute the real parties in interest, pursuant to rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court ruled that because the "Estate of Martin Haro is not an heir and did not have the
capacity to sue, the Complaint and Amended Complaint are nullities." The trial court therefore
granted defendants1 motion and denied plaintiffs motion with prejudice. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Proper Plaintiff in Wrongful Death Action
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved
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Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by ruling that it did not have the capacity to sue.
Specifically, plaintiff argues that an estate has an interest in recovering for the decedent's wrongful
death. We disagree.
Utah's wrongful death statute provides that "when the death of a person not a minor is caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs, or his personal representatives for the
benefit of his heirs, may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (1992) (emphasis added). The underlying purpose of this statute is "to
provide compensation to those who were dependent upon the decedent as a sole or supplemental
means of economic and emotional support." Dennis C. Farley, Note, Decedent's Heirs Under
the Utah Wrongful Death Act, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 77, 80.
In In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1924), the Utah Supreme Court
addressed the separate identities of a decedent's heirs and a decedent's estate under the wrongful
death statute. * The court held that a claim for wrongful death is a
separate and independent cause of action and is not a continuation of the right of action
of the injured party for personal injuries. The death creates a new cause of action for the
loss suffered by the heirs by reason of the death, and only comes into existence upon the
happening of the death.

Id. 213 P.2d at 660-61. The court also held that the proceeds from a wrongful death award
may not be intermingled with the res of the estate.
The legislature intended that the proceeds obtained from the wrongdoer would not be
intermingled with other assets of the estate of the deceased. Otherwise, the cause of action
would have been vested in the personal representative alone and the amount would have
been subjected to administration by him in the same manner as other estate assets.

Id. at 660.
Section 78-11-7 clearly delineates that the decedent's heirs or his or her personal
representative (on behalf of the heirs) are the only parties that may maintain an action for
wrongful death. Section 78-11-7 does not allow for the decedent's estate to bring and maintain a
wrongful death action. We therefore conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that
plaintiff in the present case lacked the necessary capacity to sue.2
Plaintiffs Rule 17(a) Motion
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by not allowing it to amend its complaint to
substitute decedent's heirs as the real parties in interest pursuant to rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. We disagree.
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Rule 17(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor,
administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose
name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute
may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is
brought....

This rule contemplates that the party bringing suit has the capacity to sue on behalf of the
"real party in interest." If the suit is brought by a party that does not have the capacity to sue on
behalf of the "real party in interest," the suit is a nullity. Because Martin Haro's estate had no
capacity to bring an action for wrongful death, the complaint was a nullity and there remained no
cause of action in which to substitute parties. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying
plaintiffs motion to substitute real parties in interest.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiffs cause of action. Additionally, the trial court
did not err in denying plaintiffs motion to substitute parties.
Affirmed.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge
DISPOSITION
Affirmed.

OPINION FOOTNOTES
1 The 1924 version of Utah's wrongful death statute, like the current version, provided that suit could
only be brought by decedents heirs or decedents personal representative.
2 The trial court also ruled that plaintiff's action against Everardo Haro was not initiated within the
two-year statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28 (1992). Plaintiff contends that the statute of
limitations for wrongful death actions violates article XVI, section 5 of the Utah Constitution, which provides
that "the right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated." In light
of our holding that the estate is not a proper plaintiff, we need not reach plaintiffs constitutional argument.
We note, however, that statutes of limitations do not abrogate rights to sue, but merely proscribe thetimein
which those rights must be asserted. See Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993) (statutes of
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved
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limitations Ndo not abolish a substantive right to sue, but simply provide that if an action is not filed within the
specified time, the remedy is deemed to have been waived
The barring of the remedy is caused by a
plaintiffs failure to take reasonable steps to assert the cause of action within the time afforded by statute**).

(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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AUTHOR: ZIMMERMAN
OPINION

ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice :
On a writ of certiorari, plaintiff Randi Hebertson asks us to review a court of appeals decision
upholding a trial court's dismissal of her complaint against defendant Willowcreek Plaza.
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 (Ct. App.), cert granted, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah
1995). We affirm.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, "we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true
and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs." Cruz
v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah 1996) (citing Roark v.
Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Utah 1995)). "We recite the facts accordingly." Id.
On December 31, 1988, Hebertson allegedly slipped and fell on the premises of a
commercial building located at 8160 South Highland Drive, known as Willowcreek Plaza.
Within three days after the alleged accident, Hebertson contacted the building manager, who
referred her to an adjuster at State Farm Insurance. In November of 1992, approximately one
month before the statute of limitations expired, Hebertson filed a complaint against
"Willowcreek Plaza" and served the complaint on one of the managers of Willow Creek Plaza,
L.C., which owned the building at the time the complaint was filed. Willow Creek Plaza, L.C.,
moved to dismiss the complaint because it did not own the building at the time of the alleged
accident.
At the time Hebertson allegedly fell, the building was owned by Bank One, Utah, formerly
known as Valley Bank and Trust Company ("Valley Bank"), subject to an undivided eighty
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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percent interest in the property held by Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB ("Dime
Savings"), pursuant to a participation agreement. The banks acquired title to the property after
Willow Creek Shopping Village, Ltd., defaulted on its construction loan. Thereafter, Valley
Bank entered into various leases with tenants at the building. On all leases, Valley Bank was
designated as the landlord, and all leases were executed by Valley Bank and Trust Company. The
leases variously referred to the building as "Willow Creek Shopping Village," "Willow Creek
Plaza Executive Offices," "Willow Creek Plaza," and "Willow Creek Plaza Development."
On the basis of these facts, the trial court dismissed the original complaint without
prejudice.^ Hebertson then refiled her complaint under the savings statute, section 78-12-40 of
the Utah Code, again naming Willowcreek Plaza in the caption but this time serving the
complaint on Valley Bank and Dime Savings, naming them as defendants in the body of the
complaint. Valley Bank and Dime Savings moved to dismiss, arguing that they could not be sued
under the name "Willowcreek Plaza." Hebertson opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that
Valley Bank and Dime Savings could be sued under the name "Willowcreek Plaza" because they
were "transacting business under a common name." See Utah R. Civ. P. 17(d). Valley Bank and
Dime Savings produced the affidavit of Brad R. Baldwin, general counsel for Valley Bank,
asserting that "at no time . . . did Valley Bank and Dime Savings transact business as
'Willowcreek Plaza.'" The trial court granted the banks' motion to dismiss.^
Hebertson appealed the dismissal to this court, and we poured the case to the Utah Court of
Appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, reasoning that there was "insufficient
evidence that Valley Bank and Dime Savings transacted business or held themselves out to the
public under the common name of Willowcreek Plaza. . . . 'Willowcreek Plaza' was merely
the name given to the property . . . ." Hebertson, 895 P.2d at 841. The court of appeals
concluded that "the mere name accorded a piece of property does not constitute doing business
under that name for purposes of Rule 17(d)." Id. Hebertson sought review by this court, and we
granted certiorari. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995).
We first identify the appropriate standard of review. "On certiorari, we review the decision of
the court of appeals, not the decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199
(Utah 1995) (citing Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992)). In reviewing the
court of appeals' opinion, we adopt the same standard of review used by that court: "Questions of
law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly
erroneous." Id. (citing Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990)). The
court of appeals, after noting that Valley Bank and Dime Savings conceded that they were doing
business together, went on to find "that the mere name accorded a piece of property does not
constitute doing business under that name for purposes of Rule 17(d)." Hebertson, 895 P.2d at
841. This is a conclusion of law which we review for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
936 (Utah 1994).
We begin by examining Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(d), which provides, "When two or
more persons associated in any business . . . not a corporation, transact such business under a
common name . . . they may sue or be sued by such common name." Utah R. Civ. P. 17(d).
Clearly the rule contemplates two factors: (i) parties transacting business, and (ii) transacting
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc , and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc All Rights Reserved
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such business under a common name. In this case, the parties conceded at oral argument that
Valley Bank and Dime Savings were transacting business when they assumed title to the
property, pursuant to a participation agreement, and entered into leases with various tenants for
portions of the property. However, there was simply no evidence before the court suggesting that
Valley Bank and Dime Savings ever transacted business under the name "Willowcreek Plaza."
All evidence of business transacted by the two banks, i.e., the leases entered into with various
tenants and the participation agreement itself, indicate that business was done in the name of
Valley Bank and Trust Company. Even the leases themselves do not consistently refer to the
property by the name "Willowcreek Plaza."
We do not here articulate a test for determining when parties are transacting business under a
common name. We simply hold that the name of a building owned by parties transacting
business together, even if such business relates solely to that building, is not enough, without
more, to establish that the parties were transacting business under the name of the building for
purposes of rule 17(d). Hebertson argues to the contrary but cites no authority for her
contentions. We have researched the question exhaustively and can find no authority on the
point, a fact which we take as evidence for the proposition that the rule we announce is so clear it
has never been deemed worthy of address by any appellate court. Our decision today should
settle this hitherto unasked question for Utah. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' ruling
upholding the trial court's dismissal of Hebertson's complaint.
Associate Chief Justice Stewart, Justice Howe, Justice Durham, and Justice Russon concur in
Chief Justice Zimmerman's opinion.
DISPOSITION
Affirmed

OPINION FOOTNOTES
1 Hebertson apparently opposed the motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, moved to amend the
complaint to name Valley Bank and Dime Savings. The trial court in that action apparently dismissed the
action because Valley Bank and Dime Savings had not been served within the 120 days provided by rule
and, having dismissed the action, did not reach the motion to amend. Neither party to this appeal has
provided any documentation of this first action, so we are forced to reconstruct the events, as best we can,
from the parties' descriptions in their briefs and their statements at oral argument. Needless to say, our
decision does not turn on any facts relating to this first action.
2 Because Valley Bank and Dime Savings presented Baldwin's affidavit with their motion to dismiss
and the trial court did not specifically exclude that evidence, the motion to dismiss should have been
treated as a motion for summary judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b) ("If. . . matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 . . . ."). The parties
conceded at oral argument before the court of appeals that the trial court's "ruling is best characterized as
a grant of summary judgment." Hebertson v. Willowcreek, 895 P.2d 839, 840 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Neither party challenged this characterization on appeal.
We also note that rule 12 further provides that once evidence outside the pleadings is presented, "all
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc , and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc All Rights Reserved
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parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). We have held that "it is necessary that the record clearly and affirmatively
demonstrate that when a motion to dismiss is made and '. . . matters outside the pleading are presented
to and not excluded by the court . . .' that all parties . . . are given reasonable opportunity to present
additional pertinent material if they wish." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n, 587
P.2d 151, 152 (Utah 1975) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)). Apparently, Hebertson was never given
additional time nor allowed any discovery which might have produced evidence that the banks were doing
business under the common name "Willowcreek Plaza." However, nothing in the record presented to this
court indicates that Hebertson ever asked for such time or discovery. Moreover, Hebertson failed to raise
this issue on appeal, and we will therefore not address it. Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 956 & n.6
(Utah 1994).
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In re District Justice Bradford Clark
TIMBERS, Lehigh County Magisteria! District 31-2-03.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted Jan. 3, 1997.
Decided June 16, 1997.
No. 0178 Judicial Administration Docket
a. 1.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
AND NOW, this 16th day of June, 1997. in
ht of the removal of District Justice Timrs from office, this matter is dismissed as
K)t.

i KEY NUM6EP SYSTEM >

thony HORBAL and John Horbal, indiiduals for the use and benefit of Highand Financial Ltd, a corporation, and
fames R. Walsh, an individual,
MOXHAM NATIONAL BANK,
a corporation.
Appeal of HIGHLAND FINANCIAL
LTD. & James Walsh.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted July 8, 1996.
Decided Julv 10, 1997.
Assignees of mortgagors' causes of aci against bank sued bank, alleging that
k violated Deficiency Judgment Act by
•idating certificate of deposit (CD) asied to bank to secure mortgage loan, and
applying proceeds of CD to loan balance
r foreclosing on mortgage. The Court
Common Pleas, Cambria County, Civil
ision. No. 1992-735, Leahey, J., granted
unary judgment for bank. Assignees ap-

pealed. The Superior Court, No. 1029 Pittsburgh 1993, 441 Pa.Super. 463, 657 A.2d
1261, affirmed, and review was granted.
The Supreme Court, No. 24 W.D.1996, Castille, J., by an equally divided court, held
that CD was not personal asset of mortgagors on date of sheriffs sale pursuant to
negotiable instruments provisions of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and thus
bank did not have to comply with Deficiency
Judgment Act before liquidating CD.
Affirmed.
Newman, J., filed opinion in support of
reversal, in which Cappy and Nigro, JJ.,
joined.
1. Execution 0=>353
Deficiency Judgment Act applies whenever real property of debtor has been sold in
execution to judgment creditor for sum less
than amount of judgment, interest, and costs.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103
2. Execution o=>353
Under Deficiency Judgment Act, creditor's judgment against debtor is reduced by
fair market value of property purchased by
creditor, rather than by actual sale price of
property. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103.
3. Execution 0=353
Objective of Deficiency judgment Act is
to relieve debtor from further personal liability to judgment creditor when real property
taken by judgment creditor on an execution
has fair market value on date of sale sufficient so that judgment creditor can dispose
of property to others without further loss.
(Per Castille, J., with two judges concurring.)
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103.
4. Mortgages 0=556
After foreclosing on mortgage and purchasing mortgaged property at sheriffs sale,
bank was not required to proceed under Deficiency Judgment Act before liquidating certificate of deposit (CD), which mortgagors
had assigned to bank as further security for
mortgage loan, and applying proceeds of CD
to loan balance, since Act was designed to
protect debtor's personal assets, and CD was
not personal asset of mortgagors on date of
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sheriffs sale, by operation of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). (Per Castille. J., with
two judges concurring.)
13 Pa.C.S.A.
S§ 3104, 3201(a), 3301, 3302(a); §§ 3119(b),
3305(1)119921; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103.
5. Mortgages <2>211
Once mortgagors assigned certificate of
deposit (CD) to bank as security for mortgage loan, bank became immediately vested
in mortgagors' rights in CD, under Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) negotiable instrument provisions. (Per Castille, J., with two
judges concurring.) 13 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3104,
3201(a), 3301, 3302(a); §§ 3119(b), 3305(1)
[1992]; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103.
6. Bills and Notes <S=>363
Under Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), bank became holder in due course of
certificate of deposit (CD) assigned by mortgagors to bank as security for mortgage loan,
since bank's loan constituted value and bank
took CD without notice of it being overdue or
subject to any defenses, and, thus, under
terms of assignment of deposit giving bank
absolute right to enforce payment in its own
name upon default, CD ceased being personal asset of mortgagors after they defaulted
on loan secured by CD. (Per Castille, J.,
with two judges concurring.) 13 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 3104, 3201(a), 3301, 3302(a); §§ 3119(b),
3305(1) [1992]; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103.
7. Assignments C=»31, 90
"Assignment" is transfer of property or
some other right from one person to another,
and, unless in some way qualified, it extinguishes assignors right to performance by
obligor and transfers that right to assignee.
(Per Castille, J., with two judges concurring.)
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

8. Assignments <^>90
Under lawT of assignment, assignee succeeds to no greater rights than those possessed by assignor. (Per Castille, J., with
two judges concurring.)
9. Assignments ^ 7 2
Assignment will ordinarily be construed
in accordance with rules of construction governing contracts and circumstances sur-

rounding execution of assignment document.
(Per Castille, J., with two judges concurring.)
10, Mortgages <s=>211
Based on language of assignment of deposit and circumstances under which certificate of deposit (CD) was assigned by debtors
to bank as security for mortgage loan, assignment agreement divested debtors of any
ownership and control of CD on date of
default and vested such rights in bank; assignment appointed bank as true and lawful
attorney with all rights, title, and interest in
CD, it gave bank power to execute and to
withdraw CD upon default without notice or
debtors' further consent, and it could only be
released upon parties' agreement or upon full
repayment of debt. (Per Castille, J., with
two judges concurring.)

James R. Walsh, Johnstown, for Highland
Financial, Ltd. & James Walsh.
Jeffrey T. Morris, Pittsburgh, for Moxham
National Bank.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA,
CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and
NEWMAN, JJ.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
The Court being evenly divided, the order
of the Superior Court is affirmed.
CASTILLE, J., files an Opinion in Support
of Affirmance in which FLAHERTY, C.J.,
and ZAPPALA, J., join.
NEWMAN, J., files an Opinion in Support
of Reversal in which CAPPY and NIGRO,
JJ., join.
OPINION IN SUPPORT
OF AFFIRMANCE
CASTILLE, Justice.
The issue on appeal is whether a
bank judgment creditor who purchases the
debtor's real property which has been
pledged as collateral for the underlying debt
at a sheriffs sale in a mortgage foreclosure
action, has the right after the sheriffs sale to
liquidate a certificate of deposit assigned to it
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ecurity for the same debt without comfig with the provisions of the Deficiency
^rnent Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8103, et seq.
ause we find that the bank/judgment
litor, under the circumstances of this
.', did not have to comply with the Deficy Judgment Act before liquidating the
ificate of deposit, we affirm the Superior
rt order.1
he relevant facts giving rise to this apare that on February 4. 1988, Moxham
ional Bank ("Moxham") loaned $120,000
ohn HorbaL Anthony Horbal and Elaine
ms, co-partners t/a Potomac Associates
collectively, the "Debtors"), for the acquim of property at 502 Main Street in
nstown, Pennsylvania. As collateral for
loan, Debtors executed a mortgage on
. property in favor of Moxham. On Feb"y 11, 1988, the mortgage in favor of
cham wTas duly recorded.
n February 18, 1988, John Horbal and
hony Horbal, in their individual capaci, executed an instrument entitled Assignit of Deposits wiiereby they assigned a
,000 Certificate of Deposit ("CD") to MoxI in order to provide additional security
the loan because the value of the properstanding alone did not fully secure the
t. The Assignment of Security, in relet part, provides that:
T]he undersigned, Anthony Horbal and
ohn Horbal (hereinafter the called "Asgnors"), for and in consideration of good
nd valuable consideration in hand paid,
ie receipt and sufficiency of all of wrhich is
ereby acknowiedged, does hereby ASIGN, TRANSFER and PLEDGE to the
loxham National Bank . .. (hereinafter
ailed "Bank") all of Assignors' right, title
nd interest, on Certificate of Deposit
lumber 2005581, in the principal amount
f Twenty Five thousand and 00/100 Dol*rs ($25,000) . . . (all of which is hereafter
ailed the "Account") . . .
Appellants raise two other issues on appeal,
irst, appellants argue that the liquidation of the
irtificaie of deposit without complying with the
eficiencv Judgment Act amounted to Moxham
ational Bank charging and collecting a usuries rate of interest that would entitle them to
e
hlc damages under 41 P.S. § 502. Second.
Ppcllants argue that if the liquidation of the
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This Assignment and security interest is
granted to the Bank [Moxham] to secure
the prompt and unconditional payment and
performance wrhen due of the following (all
of which is herein called the "Indebtedness").
Any and all indebtedness, obligations and
liabilities of Potomac Associates II (hereinafter the "Debtors") to the Bank, now or
hereafter existing or arising, due or to
become due.
Assignors hereby constitutes [sic] and appoints [sic] the Bank their true and lawful
attorney, with full powrer of substitution, (i)
to ask, demand, collect, receive, receipt for,
sue for, compound and give acquittance for
any and all amounts winch may be due or
become due and payable under the Account (ii) to execute any and all withdrawal
receipts or other orders for the payment of
money drawii on the Account, (iii) anaVor
to withdraw all or part of the Account
without notice to or further consent by
Assignors.
Upon the complete payment of the indebtedness or upon the mutual agreement of
the Assignors and the Bank, the Bank will
release or partially release this Assignment.
If for any reason any of the indebtedness
is not paid on or before the maturity thereof . . . or if Assignor or Debtors shall
default in the performance of any covenant
or other agreement of this Assignment or
of any other agreement now or hereinafter
executed in connection with or as security
for any of the indebtedness the Bank shall
be entitled to receive or withdraw any or
all items or all funds in the Account.
The rights and remedies of the Bank under this Assignment and any other instrument or agreement executed in connection
with or as security for any of the Indebtedcertificate of deposit amounted to charging a
usurious rate of interest, they are entitled to
attorney's lees under 41 P.S. § 503. Because we
hold that the Deficiency Judgment Act does not
apply under the facts of this case and these two
issues depend on the Deficiency Judgment Act
being applicable we need not address these two
issues
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ness shall be cumulative, and the exercise
or partial exercise of any such right or
remedy shall not preclude the exercise of
any right or remedy.
In 1989, Debtors defaulted on the $120,000
loan obligation. On August 31, 1989, Moxham initiated foreclosure proceedings against
Debtors in the Cambria County Court of
Common Pleas. On October 24, 1989, the
common pleas court entered a default judgment in favor of Moxham and against Debtors. On September 7, 1990, the common
pleas court issued a Writ of Execution upon
the real property of the Debtors (502 Main
Street) which was serving as security for the
loan.
On December 14, 1990, the real property
was sold by the Cambria County Sheriff at
sheriff sale to Moxham for $666.40. On January 21, 1991, the Cambria County Sheriff
filed and delivered the deed for the real
property to Moxham. On January 29, 1991,
Moxham liquidated the CD and applied the
sum of $26,437 to the Debtors' outstanding
loan balance of approximately $116,000.
However, Moxham failed to file a petition to
fix the fair market value of the real property
pursuant to the Deficiency Judgment Act.
On November 15, 1991, John Horbal and
Anthony Horbal assigned to Highland Financial Limited and James R. Walsh (collectively, the "appellants") any rights or causes of
action they might have by virtue of Moxham's liquidation of the funds of the CD and
the application of those funds to Debtors'
outstanding loan balance. On November 20,
1991, Moxham was informed of this assignment. On November 27, 1991, appellants
made a demand of Moxham to turn over the
proceeds it realized from the liquidation of
2.

Section 502 of Title 41 provides in pertinent
part that:
[A] person who has paid a rate of interest for
a loan or use of money at a rate in excess of
that provided for by this act or otherwise by
law or has paid charges prohibited or in excess
of those allowed by this act or otherwise by
law may recover triple the amount of such
excess interest or charges in a suit at law
against the person who has collected such excess interest or charges.
41 P.S. § 502.

the CD. Moxham subsequently refuse
comply with appellants' request.
On March 18, 1992, appellants filed a (
plaint against Moxham to recover the
ceeds from the CD asserting that Mox
failed to comply with the provisions of
Deficiency Judgment Act, 42 Pa.
§ 8103(d). Appellants' complaint sought
ble damages against Moxham for alleg
charging a usurious rate of interest whe
liquidated the CD, pursuant to 41
§ 502,2 and further sought attorney fees
prosecuting this action, pursuant to 41
§ 503.3 At the close of discover}7, appelh
and Moxham filed cross-motions for s
mary judgment. On June 22, 1993, the t
court granted summary judgment in favo
Moxham on the grounds that the Deficie
Judgment Act had no bearing on Moxha
ability to liquidate the CD and to apply
proceeds to partially satisfy the outstanci
debt remaining after the sheriffs sale of
real property pledged as collateral for
debt. In reaching this conclusion, the t
court reasoned that Moxham's right to
CD arose out of a contract separate i
distinct from the mortgage on the prope
securing the loan. Moreover, the trial co
reasoned that the rights to the CD vesi
totally in Moxham on the date of defai
Thus, the trial court found that the CD v
no longer a personal asset of the Debtors
the time that the sheriffs sale occurri
Therefore, since the CD belonged to M<
ham and it was not a personal asset of t
Debtors, the trial court concluded that M<
ham was free to liquidate the CD anytii
after the loan default without having to co
ply with the provisions of the Deficien
Judgment Act.
Appellants then appealed to the Superi
Court. An en banc Superior Court, in a fiv
3. Section 503(a) of Title 41 provides that:
[I]f a borrower or debtor, including but n
limited to a residential mortgage debtor, pi
vails in an action under this act. he sh;
recover the aggregate amount of costs ai
expenses determined by the court to have bei
reasonably incurred on his behalf in conne
tion with the prosecution of such action, t
gether with a reasonable amount for attorney
fee.
41 P.S. § 503(a).
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to-four decision, affirmed the trial court.4
On April 11, 1996, we granted allocatur to
determine whether the Deficiency Judgment
Act applied to situations such as those presented in this case.5

ing in the matter in which the judgment
was entered.
(d) Action in absence of petition.- If the
judgment creditor shall fail to present a
petition to fix the fair market value of the
real
property sold within the time after the
Summary judgment may be granted only
sale
of such real property as provided by
when it is clear from the pleadings and the
section
5522 (relating to six months limitaevidence that there is no genuine issue of
tion),
the
debtor, obligor, guarantor or any
material fact and that the moving party is
other
person
liable directly or indirectly to
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
the
judgment
creditor for the payment of
Marks v. Taxman, 527 Pa. 132, 134, 589 A.2d
the
debt,
or
any
person interested in any
205, 206 (1991) (citing Pa. R.C.P. 1035(b;).
real
estate
which
would, except for the
Summary judgment is appropriate only in
provisions of this section, be bound by the
those cases which are clear and free from
judgment, may file a petition, as a suppledoubt. Id. A trial court's grant of summary
mentary petition in the matter in which the
judgment will not be reversed unless it is
judgment
was entered, in the court having
established that the court committed an erjurisdiction,
setting forth the fact of the
ror of law or clearly abused its discretion.
sale,
and
that
no petition has been filed
Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 215. 666
within
the
time
limited by statute after the
<L2d 245, 248 (1995).
sale to fix the fair market value of the
Sections 8103(a) and 8103(d) of the Defiproperty sold, whereupon the court, after
riency Judgment Act provide as follows:
notice as prescribed by the general rule,
and being satisfied of such facts, shall di§ 8103. Deficiency judgments
rect the clerk to mark the judgment satis(a) General Rule.- Whenever any real
fied, released and discharged.
property is sold, directly or indirectly, to
42
Pa.C.S. § 8103(a) & (d).
the judgment creditor in execution proceedings and the price for which such
[1-3] The Deficiency Judgment Act approperty has been sold is not sufficient to plies whenever real property of the debtor
satisfy the amount of the judgment, inter- has been sold in execution to the judgment
est and costs and the judgment creditor creditor for a sum less than the amount of
seeks to collect the balance due on said the judgment, interest and costs. First Najudgment, interests and costs, the judg- tional Consumer Discount Co. v. Fetherman,
ment creditor shall petition the court hav- 515 Pa. 85, 95, 527 A.2d 100, 104 (1987).
ing jurisdiction to fix the fair market value Under the Deficiency Judgment Act, the
creditor's judgment against the debtor is reof the real property sold. The petition
duced by the fair market value of the propershall be filed as a supplementary proceedprovided that it could only be redeemed to satisfy
Thc majority affirmed the trial court's holding
hat the Deficiency Judgment Act did not apply
n this case. In affirming the trial court, the
najority found that in accordance with commerial paper division of the Uniform Commercial
ode, 13 Pa.C.S. § 3101 ct seq., Moxham became
holder in due course of the CD. As a holder in
ue course, the majority reasoned that Moxham
;quircd al! of Debtor's rights in the CD upon
cccution of the assignment documents. Thus,
ic majorin held that Moxham was free to liquiiie the CD either before or after the sheriffs
le subject only to the terms contained in the
signment agreement.
The four dissenting Superior Court judges bc•ved that the Deficiency Judgment Act applied
this case because the assignment and mortge were related in that thev both ensured pa\.•m ot the loan and the Assignment of the CD

an existing indebtedness. Since Moxham purchased the mortgaged property at a sheriff sale,
the dissent argued that the failure to proceed in
accordance with the provisions of the Deficiency
Judgment Act created an irrebuttable presumption that Moxham was paid in full and no further
indebtedness existed. Thus, the dissent believed
that since no amount was due Moxham, it had no
right to obtain the proceeds ol the CD.
5.

Neither party disputes that Moxham could have
liquidated the CD anytime after the Debtors defaulted on the loan up to the date of sheriff sale
on the property without complying with the Deficiency Judgment Act in order to set-off the outstanding balance due.

582

Pa.

697 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

ty purchased by the creditor rather than by
the actual sale price of the property. Id. at
96, 527 A.2d at 105. The objective of the
Deficiency Judgment Act is to relieve a debtor from further personal liability to the judgment creditor when the real property taken
by the judgment creditor on an execution has
a fair market value on the date of sale sufficient so that the judgment creditor can dispose of the property to others without a
further loss. Id.; Philip Green & Son, Inc.
v. Kimivyd, Inc., 410 Pa. 202, 205, 189 A.2d
231, 232-33 (1963).
[4] Here, Moxham bought the mortgaged
property at a sheriffs sale for a price well
under the outstanding loan balance. Under
the terms of the Assignment of Deposit,
Moxham's rights to the CD were created in
order to secure Debtors' outstanding indebtedness and its rights to the CD only terminated if the indebtedness no longer existed.
Thus, Moxham's right to liquidate the CD
depended on its interest in the CD on the
date of liquidation.
In order for any writing to qualify as a
negotiable instrument within the Commercial
Paper division of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC"), the writing must:
(1) be signed by the maker or drawer;
(2) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no
other promise, order, obligation or power
given by the maker or drawer, except as
authorized by this division;
(3) be payable on demand or at a definite
time; and
(4) be payable to order or bearer.
13 Pa.CS. § 3104.* The same division of the
UCC recognizes a certificate of deposit as a
type of negotiable instrument, 13 Pa.C.S.
§ 3104(b)(3), and that recognition is consistent with case law within the Commonwealth.
See Gordon v. Fifth Avenue Bank. 308 Pa.
323, 326-27, 162 A. 825, 826 (1932) (certificate
of deposit issued by bank in its general form
6. As recognized by the Superior Court in this
case, the Uniform Commercial Code Act of November 1, 1979 was applicable at all times material to the transactions involved in this appeal.
Thus, all references in this opinion are to that
version of the UCC rather than the 1992 amendments to the UCC.

is a negotiable instrument). Also, the negotiable character of an instrument is unaffected by a separate agreement between the
parties. 13 Pa.C.S. § 3119(b).7
When a negotiable instrument is transferred from one party to another, the transfer of the instrument "vests in the transferee
such rights as the transferor has therein."
13 Pa.CS. § 3201(a). If the transferee took
the instrument for value, in good faith, and
without notice of the instrument being overdue or subject to any defenses, the transferee becomes a holder in due course. 13 Pa.
CS. § 3302(a). As a holder in due course,
the transferee "may transfer or negotiate it
and, except as otherwise provided in section
3603 (relating to payment or satisfaction),
discharge it or enforce payment in his own
name." 13 Pa.CS. § 3301. Moreover, to the
extent that a person is a holder in due
course, he takes the instrument free from
"all claims to it on the part of any person."
13 Pa.CS. § 3305(1). As the comments to
this section note:
The language "all claims to it on part of
any person" is substituted for "any defect
in title of prior parties" in the original
Section 57 in order to make it clear that
the holder in due course takes the instrument free not only from any claim of legal
title but also from all liens, equities or
claims of any other kind.
[5,6] Here, the parties do not dispute
that the CD assigned by twro of the Debtors
(the Horbals) to Moxham met all the prerequisites of negotiability. Thus, the negotiability of the CD was completely unaffected by
the separate mortgage agreement executed
two weeks earlier between Debtors and Moxham. When the assignment documents for
the CD were executed, Moxham became immediately vested in all of the Debtors rights
in the CD. Also, since the loan Moxham
extended constituted value and Moxham took
the CD without notice of it being overdue or
subject to any defenses, Moxham became a
7. Section 3119(b) provides that "[A] separate
agreement does not affect the negotiability of an
instrument."
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holder in due course of the CD. As such, the
terms of the Assignment of Deposit gave
Moxham the absolute right to enforce payment in its own name upon default. Therefore, the CD ceased being a personal asset of
two of the Debtors after the Debtors defaulted on the loan secured by the CD. Accordingly, since the Deficiency Judgment Act is designed to protect a debtor's personal assets
and the CD was not a personal asset of the
Debtors on the date of the sheriffs sale, the
Deficiency Judgment Act does not apply to
this situation and Moxham was free to liquidate the CD in accordance with the term? of
the assignment agreement.
Policy reasons also support the conclusion
that the Deficiency Judgment Act does not
apply in this situation. The effect of our
decision today is that it provides protection
against a default to a lender who obtains
security for a loan. By giving the lender
protection in cases of default, it will encourage lending and increase the ability to obtain
a properly secured loan. This, in turn, will
have the desired effect of encouraging the
expansion of commerce.
[7-9] Moreover, the conclusion urged by
appellants, i.e., applying the Deficiency Judgment Act, would lead to a result clearly not
intended by the parties when they executed
the Assignment of Deposit agreement. An
assignment is a transfer of property or some
other right from one person to another, and
unless in some way qualified, it extinguishes
the assignor's right to performance by the
obligor and transfers that right to the assignee. In re Purman's Estate, 358 Pa. 187, 56
A.2d 86 (1948). Under the law of assignment, the assignee succeeds to no greater
rights than those possessed by the assignor.
Himes r Cameron County Construction
Corjx, 497 Pa. 637, 640, 444 A.2d 98, 100
(1982). In interpreting an assignment, it will
ordinarily be construed in accordance with
the rules of construction governing contracts
and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the assignment document. U.S.
National Bank v Campbell 354 Pa. 483, 47
A.2d 697 (1946).
[10] Here, the assignment appointed
Moxham as the true and lawful attorney with
all rights, title and interest in the CD. Al>o.
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the assignment gave Moxham the power to
execute and to withdraw any or all of the CD
upon default without any notice or further
consent of the Horbals. Moreover, the assignment to Moxham could only be released
upon agreement of the parties or upon full
repayment of the indebtedness. As the Superior Court majority in this case aptly noted:
[AJpplying established contract law, the
parties wTell could have provided for contingencies requiring other, additional action
by the Bank [Moxham] prior to its exercise
of a clear right to liquidate the CD that is
contained in the agreement. They did not.
When the economic realities of the transaction are considered, it is not surprising
that the Bank sought, and obtained, additional security. When the debtors defaulted on the mortgage note, the Bank's act in
liquidating the CD wTas predictable. Based
on this language and the circumstance under which the CD was assigned to Moxham
(to provide additional security for a loan),
we must conclude that the assignment
clearly and unambiguously divested the
Horbals of any ownership and control of
the CD on the date of default and vested
such rights in Moxham.
441 Pa.Super. at 472, 657 A.2d at 1265.
Therefore, based on the language of the Assignment of Deposit and the circumstances
under which the CD was assigned to Moxham, it is clear that the assignment agreement divested the Debtors (the Horbals) of
any ownership and control of the CD on the
date of default and vested such rights in
Moxham.
In conclusion, we hold that the Deficiency
Judgment Act does not apply to the present
situation. Thus, in accordance with the assignment agreement, Moxham had the right
to liquidate the CD after Debtors defaulted
on the loan. Any other conclusion would
render the additional security assigned by
the Debtors to Moxham, via a contract, illuson since it would provide the Debtors with
the means to circumvent a contractual pledge
and Moxham would never be able to reach
the security assigned to it to secure the
indebtedness. Accordingly, for the reasons
stated above, we affirm the order of the
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iat the Deficiency
apply to the facts of
., and ZAPPALA, J., join
pport of .Affirmance.
, J., files an Opinion in Support
in which CAPPY and NIGRO,

/OV IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL
disagree with the Majority that a judg.ent creditor, who purchases the judgment
debtor's real estate at a sheriffs sale, has the
right to redeem a certificate of deposit (CD)
assigned to it as additional security for the
underlying debt without complying with the
Deficiency Judgment Act (the Act), 42 Pa.
C.S. § 8103.l Where the judgment creditor
then fails to file a timely petition to fix the
fair market value of the real property sold in
compliance with the Act, the underlying debt
is extinguished and the judgment creditor is
precluded from redeeming the additional collateral security. Therefore, I respectfully
dissent.
Neither party disputes the facts relevant
to this appeal. On February 4, 1988, Moxham National Bank 'Moxham) granted a loan
of $120,000.00 to John Horbal, .Anthony Horbal and Elaine Adams, d/b/a Potomac Associates II (Debtors, collectively). The Debtors
executed a mortgage in favor of Moxham on
property owned by the partnership at 502
Main Street in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, as
collateral for the loan. The parties understood that the value of the property was not
sufficient to fully secure the loan. Therefore,
on February 18, 1988, John and Anthony
1. As stated by the Majority, the Deficiency Judgment Act provides:
Whenever any real property is sold, directly or
indirectly, to a judgment creditor in execution
proceedings and the price lor which such
property has been sold is not sufficient to satisfy the amount of the judgment, interests and
costs and the judgment creditor seeks to collect the balance due on said judgment, interests and costs, the judgment creditor shall petition the court having jurisdiction to fix the fair
market value of the reai property sold.
42 Pa.C.S. § 8103(a). If the judgment creditor
fails to file a petition to fix fair market value
within six (6) months of the sale, upon petition of
the debtor, the court will mark the judgment as

Horbal executed in favor of Moxham an "Assignment of Deposits" as additional security
for the loan due by the Debtors. Pursuant
to the express terms of the Assignment of
Deposits instrument, Anthony and John Horbal agreed to:
ASSIGN, TRANSFER and PLEDGE to
Moxham National Bank ... all of the Assignors' right, title and interest, on Certificate of Deposit Number 2005581 in the
principal amount of Twenty Five Thousand
and 00/00 Dollars ($25,000)....
The assignment instrument further provided:
This Assignment and security interest is
granted to the Bank to secure the prompt
and unconditional payment and performance when due of the following (all of
which is herein called the "Indebtedness").
Any and all indebtedness, obligations and
liabilities of Potomac Associates II to the
Bank, now or hereafter existing or arising,
due or to become due.

Upon the complete payment of the indebtedness or upon the mutual agreement of
the Assignors and the Bank, the Bank will
release or partially release this Assignment.
Subsequently, the Debtors defaulted on
the loan. Moxham initiated a mortgage foreclosure action in the Cambria County Court
of Common Pleas. The court entered a judgment in favor of Moxham in the amount of
$130,946.83 and issued a Writ of Execution
on the judgment. Moxham then purchased
the property at a sheriffs sale on December
14, 1990 for a bid price of $666.40.2 On
satisfied. 42 Pa.C.S. § 3103(d); First National
Consumer Discount Co. v. Fethernian. 515 Pa. 85,
527 A.2d 100(1987).
The Act applies with equal force to actions in
rem and in personam. See Fethernian; Valley
Trust Company of Palmxra v. Lapitsky. 339
Pa.Super. Ml, 488 A.2d 608 (1985); Marine
Midland Bank v. Sunbelt, Inc.. 718 F.2d 61J
(1933). But see First Pennsylvania Bank v. Lancaster County Tax Claim Bureau, 504 Pa. 179,
470 A.2d 938 (1983)(opinion announcing judgment ot court).
2.

Moxham acknowledges that, in 1991, the appraised fair market value of the property was
$57,500.00. In 1994, Moxham sold the property
to a third party for the appraised value.
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January 29, 1991, Moxham withdrew the CD
and applied the proceeds, $26,437.00, to the
remaining loan balance.
In November of 1991, Anthony and John
Horbal assigned to Highland Financial, Ltd.
and James R. Walsh (Appellants, collectively)
their rights or causes of action, if any. relating to Moxham's withdrawal of the CD. Appellants subsequently demanded that Moxham return the proceeds realized on the
withdrawal of the CD. Moxham refused to
turn over the CD proceeds. Appellants then
filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of
Cambria County (trial court) against Moxham seeking the value of the CD and other
relief. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Moxham. The Superior
Court affirmed.3
The Majority Opinion, authored by Mr.
Justice Castille. affirms the Order of the
Superior Court, holding that Moxham was
free to redeem the CD without complying
with the Deficiency Judgment Act, 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 8103. Based on the premise that the Assignment of Deposits transferred to Moxham
all of the Debtors' rights and interests in the
CD, the Majority Opinion turns on the negotiability of the CD pursuant to Article 3 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), 13
Pa.CS. §§ 3101-3122. Unlike the Majority,
however, I believe the principal focus of our
inquiry is not the negotiability of the CD, but
the nature of the assignment of the CD.
Contrary to the Majority's reliance on Article
3 of the UCC, relating to commercial paper,
I believe this case is properly resolved with
reference to Article 9,13 Pa.C.S. §§ 9101-14,
bating to secured transactions. Because I
conclude that the assignment did not divest
the Debtors of all their rights and interests
to the CD, but merely granted Moxham a
security interest in the CD, I conclude that
Moxham was required to comply with the
Deficiency Judgment Act.
It is well-settled that an assignment is a
transfer of property, or a right or interest in
5

* Summary judgment is proper where "the
Ptaadings, depositions, answers to interrogator s , and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
*fcsue as to am material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
la
* " Pa R.C.P. 1035(bjT The record is to be
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property, and, unless in some uvy qualified,
transfers the assignor's entire interest in the
property. Purman Estate, 358 Pa. 187, 56
A.2d 86 (1948)(emphasis added). Likewise,
an assignment, absolute on its face, may only
give the assignee a qualified interest in the
assigned property, commensurate with the
debt or liability secured. Seip v. Luubach,
333 Pa. 225, 4 A.2d 149 (1939). In construing
an assignment, courts may properly consider
the circumstances attending the assignment.
United States National Bank in Johnstoum
v. Campbell 354 Pa. 483, 47 A.2d 697 (1946).
Thus, parole evidence is admissible to establish that an assignment, absolute on its face,
was intended to operate only as security for a
debt. Biddle v. Biddle, 363 Pa. 426, 70 A.2d
281 (1950).
As defined in the UCC, a "security interest" is an interest in personal property that
secures payment of an obligation. 13 Pa.C.S.
§ 1201. With certain exceptions, which are
not relevant here, Article 9 of the UCC applies "to any transaction (regardless of its
form) which is intended to create a security
interest in personal property or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts
. . . " 13 Pa.C.S. § 9102(a), and to security
interests created by contract, including assignments, 13 Pa.C.S. § 9102(b). An enforceable security interest is created when:
(1) the collateral is in the possession of the
secured party pursuant to an agreement or
the debtor has signed a security agreement
that contains a description of the collateral;
(2) value has been given; and (3) the debtor
has rights in the collateral. 13 Pa.C.S.
§ 9203(a); see also Reuter v. Citizens &
Northern Bank, 410 Pa.Super. 199, 599 A.2d
673 (1991).
Here, by the express terms of the assignment instrument, Anthony and John Horbal
assigned all of their right, title and interest
in the CD to Moxham. Although the assignment instrument may appear absolute on its
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pennsylvania State University v.
County of Centre, 532 Pa. 142. 615 A.2d 303
(1^92). Summary judgment is appropriate only
where the right to relief is clear and free from
doubt hi
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face, it is undisputed that the parties intended the CD to operate as additional security
for the underlying $120,000.00 loan obligation. Moxham acknowledges that the Horbals executed the Assignment of Deposits as
additional collateral security for the loan because the parties understood that the real
estate was insufficient to fully secure the
debt. Further, although the assignment instrument refers to a grant of title, it also
refers to the grant of a security interest to
Moxham to secure any and all indebtedness.
The instrument identifies the CD (wrhich was
in Moxham's possession) and acknowledges
receipt of valuable consideration for the assignment. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the assignment,
and the assignment instrument itself, indicate that the assignment was not absolute—it
did not divest the Debtors of all of their
rights and interests in the CD, but merely
granted Moxham a security interest in the
CD as additional collateral for the loan. Biddie; Purman Estate; Seip. Because Moxham
merely acquired a security interest in the
CD, after the foreclosure sale, Moxham was
required to comply with the Deficiency Judgment Act before redeeming the additional
collateral securing the debt. First National
Consumer Discount Co. v. Fetherman, 515
Pa. 85, 527 A.2d 100 (1987), Commonwealth
Bank & Trust Co. v. Hemsley, 395 Pa.Super.
447, 577 A.2d 627, allocatur denied, 525 Pa.
664, 583 A.2d 793 (1990); Auerbach v. Corn
Exchange National Bank & Trust Co., 148
F.2d 709 (1945).
Upon default of the loan obligation, the
Assignment of Deposits expressly granted
Moxham the right to withdraw funds from
the CD account, but required Moxham to
return the CD upon complete payment of
the "indebtedness." By operation of the Deficiency Judgment Act, Moxham was required to file a petition to fix the fair market
value of the real estate sold to determine the
remaining "indebtedness" under the Assignment of Deposits. Fetherman; Hemsley,
Auerbach. Moxham, however, failed to file a
deficiency petition before redeeming the CD,
within the six-month time limitation as provided in the Deficiency Judgment Act. 42
Pa.C.S. § 8103. Moxham's failure to file a
deficiency judgment petition within six (6)

months of the sale of the real property <
ated an irrebuttable presumption that
foreclosure sale fully satisfied the Debt
indebtedness. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8103(d); FeU
man. Thus, any "indebtedness," as defii
in the Assignment of Deposits, was ex
guished. Consequently, Moxham's w:
drawal of funds from the CD violated
assignment agreement, which had mer
granted Moxham a security interest foi
debt that no longer existed. Appellants a
therefore, entitled to recover the CD p
ceeds.
The Majority asserts that policy consid
ations support the non-application of the I
ficiency Judgment Act to this case. Pun
ant to the Majority Opinion, however,
judgment creditor is capable of a double i
covery, clearly in contravention of the pi
poses of the Deficiency Judgment Act. \
clearly explained in Fetherman:
the Deficiency Judgment Act ... was e
acted to remedy an inequity resulting
judgment debtors when the judgme
creditor bought the debtor's property at
forced sale. Prior to adoption of the Act
judgment creditor could purchase, at she
iff s sale, valuable real estate of the debt
for a nominal sum, (i.e. costs and taxei
and yet retain the full amount of his jud
ment. The debtor w7as to be credited on
for the actual sum realized at the sal
Under the Deficiency Judgment Act, tl
creditor's judgment is to be reduced by tl
fair market value of the property bougl
by the creditor rather than the sale pric
Id. at 96, 527 A.2d at 105 (citations omitteo
Thus, the purpose of the Act is to protect
debtor's personal assets wThen, as here, r
real property is sold at a foreclosure sale f(
a purchase price far below7 its fair mark<
value. Application of the Act, under thes
circumstances, does not render additional s<
curity "illusory7," as stated by the Majority
Had Moxham complied with the Act, th
judgment against the Debtors would onl
have been reduced by the fair market valu
of the property sold. Moxham would hav
then been entitled to recover the value of th'
CD. Only Moxham's failure to file a deficien
cy judgment petition voided this additions
securitv.
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DAVIDSON, Judge:
The Third District Court denied plaintiffs Motions for Leave to File Amended Complaint
and for a Continuance while it granted defendant's Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice. Plaintiff
appeals claiming that it was error not to have allowed the amendment of the complaint and to
have dismissed with prejudice. We reverse and remand.
Plaintiffs complaint was filed on October 7, 1982, and generally alleged breach of contract
and negligence in relation to the sale and installation of a computer system by defendant. The
complaint indicated plaintiff as a Utah professional corporation (P.C). On January 17 1983,
defendant answered and made certain counterclaims. Plaintiffs reply was filed on January 24,
1983. Plaintiffs original Certificate of Readiness for Trial was objected to and stricken on
February 24, 1983. Plaintiff was designate plaintiff as a P.C. On November 4, 1983, plaintiff to
be a Utah partnership and added, as plaintiff, one of the members of the partnership in his
individual capacity. At that time, plaintiffs counsel mailed a Stipulation and Order to Amend this
complaint to defendant's counsel which was neither signed nor returned by the latter. Another
Certificate of Readiness of Trial was filed on January 9, 1984. A pre-trial settlement conference
was held on February 15, 1984, but without positive result. The trial court's minute entry
concerning the conference indicates that the Second Amended complaint was before the court at
that proceeding at which both sides were represented by counsel.
Trial before the court was held on May 9, 1984. The Findings of Fact declare that plaintiff is
a partnership made up of three P.C.'s, not named as parties to the suit, and that the three general
partner-corporations are indispensable parties. The trial court also found that defendant's
corporate vice president and its counsel had flown to Salt Lake City from Denver and that a
continuance would substantially prejudice defendant. The trial judge dismissed plaintiffs
complaint with prejudice but then allowed defendant to proceed on its counterclaim against the
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc , and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc All Rights Reserved
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partnership. Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal was filed on July 25, 1984.
The pertinent analysis which must be undertaken is whether the trial court should have
dismissed with prejudice rather than Dismiss with Leave to Amend, grant the Motion for Leave
to Amend or grant a continuance. Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a) declares:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest... No action shall be
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a
reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the
real party in interest.
The thrust of Utah R. Civ. P. 19 is to require the joinder of persons needed for just
adjudication. Rule 19(a) instructs the trial court to join as a party a person whose absence will
prevent complete relief among those already parties. A plain reading of Rules 17(a) and 19(a)
reveals that the trial court should make every effort to insure that the proceeding adjudicates that
rights of those necessary and intended to be before the court. In conjunction with this basic
concept is the requirement in Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) which states that leave shall be freely given to
amend a pleading when justice so requires. This admonition is given the sentence which declares
that subsequent amendments to pleadings may be made only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party.
Defendant cannot claim that it was not aware of plaintiffs status as a partnership as early as
nine months prior to the trial. During the taking of deposition in August of 1983, defendant's
counsel was informed that plaintiff was a partnership. Plaintiffs status was also revealed to
defendant both by the Stipulation and Order to Amend mailed to counsel and at the pre-trial
settlement conference. 1
The issue of dismissing an action with prejudice was recently addressed by the Utah Supreme
Court in Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Michie Assoc, 728 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1986). The trial
court's dismissal for a failure to join indispensable parties was affirmed but the Supreme Court
remanded with the instruction to enter the dismissal without prejudice. That Court wrote:
While the court below properly exercised its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs action for
failing to comply with Rule 19(a), it was improper to do so with prejudice. Dismissal with
prejudice under Rule 41(b) is a harsh and permanent remedy when it precludes a presentation of
a plaintiffs claims on their merits. Our rules of procedure are intended to encourage the
adjudication of disputes on their merits.
Not having considered the merits of plaintiffs claims, there was no reason for the court to
dismiss with prejudice and prevent future consideration of the claims should the defect be
corrected. The trial court abused its discretion by entering its Rule 41(b) dismissal with
prejudice.
Id, at 1020.
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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In this case we believe the court abused its discretion in not allowing the amendment or
granting a continuance. Defendant claimed no surprise, nor could it, but instead relied on the
specter of increased costs and complexity if the amendment was granted. Despite the parties
being represented by the same counsel throughout the proceedings and despite there being no
surprise, the dismissal with prejudice was granted. While courts are given great latitude and
discretion in the application of the law, they still must have a sufficient grounds to apply the
"harsh and permanent remedy" of a dismissal with prejudice. No such grounds appear here.
The dismissal with prejudice and the judgment are reversed and the case is remanded for
trial.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
OPINION FOOTNOTES
1 At trial, counsel for defendant admitted receiving the request to stipulate to the filing of the Second
Amended complaint but stated that he was unwilling to so stipulate.
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OPINION

OAKS, Justice: This is an action by a participant in a joint venture, referred to here as a
partnership,^ to recover damages suffered when defendants thwarted the purchase and
development of property by the partnership. Neither the partnership nor plaintiffs partner was
named as a party. The trial court dismissed the action, holding that plaintiff had failed to join an
indispensable party. Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). We affirm.2
In early 1978, plaintiff discovered a parcel of real property in Washington county, Utah, that
he believed had excellent potential for development. After ascertaining that the property was for
sale, plaintiff organized a partnership under the name Padre Canyon Venture to purchase and
develop the property. Initially, the venture included plaintiff and one Sullivan as partners. These
two agreed to seek other partners to invest in the venture. Plaintiff performed preliminary work in
an effort to negotiate the purchase, clear the property of liens, and set the development in motion.
For this he was to receive a 15% interest in the Padre Canyon partnership. The remaining 85%
interest was to be divided among Sullivan and any new investors.
Plaintiff first contacted a group of investors headed by one Jacobs. Plaintiff and Sullivan
believed they had struck a deal with the Jacobs group until a dispute arose over the division of the
investors1 85%. While attempting to resolve this issue, plaintiff and Sullivan made contract with
defendants, who expressed an interest in joining the venture if negotiations with the Jacobs group
proved fruitless. Plaintiff, on behalf of Padre Canyon, discussed the project in detail with
defendants.
According to Plaintiffs rendition of the facts, which we accept as true for this appeal, St.
Pierre v. Edmonds, Utah, 645 P.2d 615, 616-17 (1982), Padre Canyon broke off negotiations
with the Jacobs group in reliance upon the defendants1 representation that they were interested in
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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joining the venture. Thereafter, defendants declined to participate in Padre Canyon, blocked that
partnership's purchase of the development property, and eventually purchased the property for
themselves. Plaintiff then brought this action in his own name to recover the damages he allegedly
suffered (through his 15% share) due to defendants1 tortious interference with contract, tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of agreement. The question on this
appeal is whether plaintiff, who was a partner in the venture, may bring an action in his own name
without joining his copartner had without naming the partnership. We hold that he cannot.
Courts universally hold that an individual partner may not sue in his own name to enforce a
liability owed to a partnership. Gustafson v. State, Ariz. App., 462 P.2d 869 (1979); Stevens v.
St. Joseph's Hospital, 52 A.D. 2d 722, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 927 (1976); Marx v. Lenske, Or., 500
P.2d 715 (1972). See 60 Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 325 (1972). One partner's failure to join all
partners as plaintiffs is grounds for dismissal for lack of necessary parties. White v. Jackson,
S.C., 166 S.E.2d 211 (1969); Benson v. Pachetti, Ala., 349 So. 2d 17 (1977). See Utah R. Civ.
P. 19(a).
Under the law of some states a partnership is empowered to sue in the partnership name. See
generally 60 Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 322-24 (1972). That question has not been decided in
this state, Wall Investment Co. v. Garden Gate Distributing, Inc., Utah, 593 P.2d 542, 544
(1979), and need not be decided in this case. If a partnership can sue in its own name, the
partnership is obviously an indispensable party in an action to enforce a partnership claim, since it
is the real party in interest. Dalby v. United states Fidelity and Guaranty Co., La. App., 365
So. 2d 568 (1978). If a partnership cannot sue in its own name, it must sue in the name of the
partners, and all are necessary parties, as explained above. In either event, this plaintiff has failed
to join an indispensable party and his complaint was properly dismissed on that basis. Utah R. Civ.
P. 17(a).
Rules 19(a) and 17(a) both seek to protect the same interests: judicial economy and fairness to
the parties in litigation. The purpose of Rule 19(a), "which requires the joinder of indispensable
parties as a condition to suit, is to guard against the entry of judgments which might prejudice the
rights of such parties in their absence." Sanpete County Water Conservancy District v. Price
Water Users Association, Utah, 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 (1982). In addition, by requiring joinder of
necessary parties, Rule 19(a) protects the interests of parties who are present by precluding
multiple litigation and contradictory claims over the same subject matter as the original litigation.
Rule 17(a) serves essentially the same policy by requiring an action to be brought by the real
party in interest. As we held in Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 Utah 2d 155, 163, 239 P.2d 745, 748
(1952):
The reason the defendant has the right to have a cause of action prosecuted by the real party
in interest is so that the judgment will preclude any action on the same demand by another and
permit the defendant to assert all defenses or counterclaims available against the real owner of the
cause.
Accord Nordling v. Johnston, Or., 283 P.2d 994, 997 (1955) (Rule 17(a) "was enacted for
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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the benefit of a party defendant, to protect himfrombeing again harassed for the same cause.").
Here, the cause of action clearly belonged to the Padre Canyon partnership or partners, and
not to plaintiff individually. In the complaint, plaintiff repeatedly states that he performed work
and made contacts "on behalf of Padre Canyon." Padre Canyon or its partners would have owned
the property had the purchase and development been successful. It was only through Padre
Canyon that plaintiff would have derived any profit, and it is only through Padre Canyon that he
suffers the damage he has alleged.
Unless plaintiff could show that he suflfered direct injury personally, as distinguished from
injury to the partnership, this complaint was properly dismissed. In Hauer v. Bankers Trust New
York Corp., 509 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. Wis. 1981), alTd per curiam, 671 F.2d 1020 (1982), a jury
awarded a plaintiff $700,001 damages for tortious interference with contractual relation.
However, the trial court granted defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v., holding that it was
actually the partnership in which plaintiff was a participant that suflfered the damage, not plaintiff
personally.
The evidence described above and the inferences the plaintiff draws from the evidence
arguably support the theory that [one of the defendants] misappropriated an equity that the
partnership had in the Scotsland project. In addition, it cannot be denied that the value of the
partnership's equity in Scotsland was directly related to the creativity and industry of the plaintiff,
James Hauer. However, this does not mean that [defendant] has deprived Mr. Hauer of any rights
or property belonging to him personally.
509 F. supp. at 175 (emphasis in original).
In our case, as in Hauer, plaintiff alleges that he dedicated hard work and energy toward the
success of the Padre Canyon partnership. However, even according to the clear allegations of
plaintiffs complaint, the rights that were infringed belonged to Padre Canyon, not to plaintiff.
Consequently, plaintiff was required either to name the partnership as the real party in interest or
to join his copartner as a necessary party.
Plaintiff argues that since he is only suing to recover his portion of the partnership's claim, he
should be entitled to go forward in his individual capacity. Plaintiff does not explain how or
whether a final judgment granting him recovery of his 15%fromdefendants would preclude the
partnership or the other partner from later suing on their claims. Nor does plaintiff explain how or
whether this action would preclude the partnership or the other partners from disputing plaintiffs
entitlement to the 15% share he seeks to collectfromdefendants. Allowing plaintiff to go forward
individually could subject defendants to multiple liability and could spawn multiple litigation
among the partnership, the individual partner, and defendants. This would be unfair to absent
partners, unfair to defendants, and contrary to judicial economy. That is undoubtedly why Rules
17(a) and 19(a) forbid such a result. As the court held in Stevens v. St Joseph's Hospital,
supra, 381 N.Y.S. 2d at 928:
Plaintiff, as an individual, cannot assert that he has been entitled to one-third of the defendant's
monthly payments under the contract, free of any partnership commitments. A partnership cause
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of action belongs to the partners jointly, and a member of the partnership may not recover on a
partnership obligation by his individual suit.
Affirmed. 3
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice,
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result.
OPINION FOOTNOTES
1 A joint venture is subject to the same rules as a partnership. Vern Shutte & Sons v. Broadbent, 24
Utah 2d 415, 473 P.2d 885 (1970); Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952); Scott Company
of California v. Enco Construction Co., Miss., 264 So. 2d 409 (1972).
2 The trial court also granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. Since we affirm the
dismissal, we do not reach the questions treated in the summary judgment.
3 Affirmance of a judgment of dismissal on the basis cited here does not preclude a plaintiff from
renewing his claim in a complaint naming the indispensable party or the real party in interest. One partner
cannot bar a copartner from collecting on debts owed to the partnership. Stark v. Utica Screw Products,
Inc., 103 Misc. 163, 425 N.Y.S. 2d 750 (1980). Where one partner refuses to join an action, the other
partners) may name him as a plaintiff by indemnifying him against costs, Benson v. Pachetti, Ala., 349 So.
2d 17 (1977), or by making him an involuntary plaintiff, Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a).
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FACTS. - Bagel Nosh executed a note to Capital guaranteed by the SBA and personally by Landes
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PROCEEDINGS, - Capital, with SBA authorization, sued to collect the note from the
personal guarantors. The district court granted summary judgment to Capital, and the guarantors
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OPINION

Petitioner Michael Landes challenges a decision of the court of appeals upholding a grant of
summary judgment in favor of respondent Capital City Bank ("Capital") on a guarantee
agreement, signed by Landes and the other plaintiffs, that was appurtenant to a note held in part
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by the Small Business Administration ("SBA"). Landes had opposed the grant of summary
judgment on grounds that, inter alia, the SBA was an indispensable party. The trial court
disagreed. Before the court of appeals, Landes argued that the trial court failed to explain
adequately its conclusion that the SBA was not indispensable under rule 19 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred by failing to explain its rule
19 analysis, but performed its own analysis and upheld the trial court's decision on the ground
that the SBA was, in fact, not an indispensable party. On certiorari, Landes again raises the rule
19 issue, this time contending that the court of appeals' analysis is flawed. We hold that the court
of appeals misanalyzed the facts under rule 19, but we affirm on grounds that the SBA is not a
necessary party.
On December 24, 1979, Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. ("Bagel Nosh"), executed a
promissory note in favor of Capital in the amount of $300,000. The SBA participated in the note
by guaranteeing 90 percent of the outstanding unpaid balance. Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and
Michael Landes ("guarantors") executed personal guaranties for the note, secured by trust deeds
to certain condominium units at Snowbird, a ski resort in Utah. The guaranties were on SBA
forms and were executed in favor of both Capital and SBA. On March 30, 1983, after Bagel
Nosh had fallen several months behind in payments, Capital and Bagel Nosh executed a
modification of the loan agreement, in which the guarantors agreed personally to guarantee the
full amount of the loan.l
On November 29, 1984, Bagel Nosh filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under chapter
11 of the bankruptcy code. On March 12, 1986, the guarantors filed this action in the district
court, naming Capital as defendant and seeking a declaratory judgment that the guaranties were
void and that the guarantors were discharged from any obligation under the guaranties. Capital
filed an answer and a counterclaim, seeking a judgment against the guarantors for the
outstanding balance of the loan plus interest. Capital also sought judicial foreclosure against the
real property and a declaration that the claims of other creditors were subordinate to Capital's
claims.
On July 25, 1986, Capital filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the guaranties
entitled Capital to judgment as a matter of law. With its motion, Capital submitted the affidavit
of M. A. Allem, executive vice president of Capital, in which he stated that the "SBA is a
participating lender in the loan of Capital City to Bagel Nosh to the extent of ninety percent
(90%) of the outstanding balance."
In response, the guarantors argued that Capital was entitled to sue only on its proportionate
share of the loan, which was 10 percent. The guarantors contended that the SBA held a 90
percent interest in the loan and, therefore, that the SBA was a necessary and indispensable party
to the action. The guarantors also argued that summary judgment was improper because a
genuine issue of fact existed with regard to the effect of the loan modification agreement.
On September 5th, Capital filed a supplemental affidavit of Mr. Allem in which he stated.
"Capital City is the legal holder of the note and guaranties... and has been authorized in writing
by SBA to sue upon the note and guaranties and accelerate the maturity thereof."
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On February 4, 1987, the trial court granted Capital's motion for summary judgment. The
court awarded Capital a judgment for the full amount of the loan plus interest, $293,379.64, and
issued a decree of foreclosure against the condominium units. In granting summary judgment,
the trial court addressed several of the guarantors' arguments, including the effect of the loan
modification agreement. The trial court, however, did not address the issue of any legal
distinction that might exist between the 10 percent portion of the loan attributable to Capital and
the 90 percent portion attributable to the SBA. The trial court also treated the issue of the
indispensability of the SB A's joinder summarily, stating:
Plaintiffs have further alleged that an indispensable party, the Small Business Administration,
has not been joined. That defense is without merit. In the first instance, the defense has not been
pled, [sic] but additionally, the SBA is not under the present interpretation of the Rules of
Procedure an indispensable party to this action.
The guarantors appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. See Seftel v. Capital City Bank,
767 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in failing
to explain the basis for its conclusion that the SBA was not indispensable under rule 19. The
court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the trial court on grounds that the SBA was not
indispensable to the action, but it did so without first addressing the preliminary rule 19(a) issue
of whether the SBA was a necessary party.
Landes petitioned for certiorari, contending that the court of appeals erred by failing to
consider the issue of whether the SBA was a necessary party before determining that the SBA
was an indispensable party. We granted certiorari and now affirm.
We note at the outset the procedural posture of this case. It comes to us on certiorari from the
court of appeals, which considered Landes' appeal from a grant of summary judgment. Summary
judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Utah State Coalition of Senior
Citizens v. Utah Power & Light, 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H
Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986). We accord no particular deference to conclusions of
law, whether made by the trial court or the court of appeals, but review such conclusions for
correctness. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988).
Landes argues that the court of appeals erred by failing to add the SBA as a necessary party.
He asserts that under a proper rule 19 analysis, a trial court should first determine whether a party
is necessary under the criteria of rule 19(a). If the party is necessary and can be joined, the rule
requires that the party be joined. Landes argues that a court must first find that a party is
necessary before it proceeds to the issue of indispensability; therefore, because the court of
appeals based its disposition of his appeal on the issue of indispensability, it must have held that
the SBA was a necessary party, even though that holding was not articulated in the decision.
Landes argues further that because joinder of the SBA was feasible, it was also mandatory under
rule 19(a). Therefore, he argues, the court of appeals erred by failing to require joinder of the
SBA.
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In response, Capital argues that the SBA is not a necessary party because the SBA authorized
Capital to assert SBA's rights under the guaranty. Alternatively, Capital argues that the court of
appeals used the terms "necessary" and "indispensable" interchangeably.
Because the disposition of this case turns on rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
we set it forth here:
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject of action shall be joined as a
party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should
join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue
of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). Rule 19(b), which deals with indispensable parties and is also at issue,
states:
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person as described in
Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity
and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be
dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered
by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be
prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions
in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth,
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b).
Rule 19 of the Utah rules is essentially similar to rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Therefore, in addition to applicable Utah cases, we look to the abundant federal
experience in the area for guidance. See Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 n.l
(Utah 1984).
The basic purpose of rule 19 is "to protect the interests of absent persons as well as those
already before the court from multiple litigation or inconsistent judicial determinations." 7 C.
Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1602, at 21 (1986)
[hereinafter C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane]; see Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah
1984) ("[B]y requiring joinder of necessary parties, rule 19(a) protects the interests of parties
who are present by precluding multiple litigation and contradictory claims over the same subject
matter as the original litigation...."). In performing a rule 19 analysis, the court should discuss
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specific facts and reasoning that lead to the conclusion that a party is or is not necessary under
rule 19(a) or indispensable under rule 19(b). See Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 559 (10th
Cir. 1977). Thus, the court of appeals was correct in holding that the trial court erred by failing to
discuss the facts and reasoning, within the framework of rule 19, by which it made its
determination of indispensability.
We next address the issue of whether the SB A was a necessary and indispensable party and
therefore should have been joined in the action. To determine whether the court of appeals erred
by declining to join the SB A, we must first determine whether the SB A was a necessary party
under rule 19(a). Only if we first find the SB A to be a necessary party can we properly proceed
to the 19(b) question of indispensability. To this extent, Landes is correct in observing that the
court of appeals improperly considered indispensability without first deciding the necessary party
question.
To determine whether a party is necessary, a court should consider the two general factors in
rule 19(a). First, a party is necessary if "in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) (1). Second, a party is necessary if he claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in
his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple,
or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) (2). If the court finds that the party is necessary according to these
criteria, rule 19 provides that the party "shall be joined." Thus, under the language of the rule, if
the party is necessary and joinder is feasible, then joinder is mandatory. Nevertheless, failure to
join generally is not considered to be a jurisdictional defect. See 7 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M.
Kane, § 1611. 2
We must therefore first address rule 19(a)(1) to determine whether in the absence of the SB A
complete relief can be accorded among the guarantors and Capital. As the court of appeals noted,
the supplemental affidavit of M. A. Allem states that Capital "has been authorized in writing by
SB A to sue upon the note and guaranties and accelerate the maturity thereof. "3 This statement
was not contradicted or challenged by the guarantors and must be accepted as an uncontested fact
for purposes of summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
With this foundation, it is clear that the absence of the SBA will not prevent Capital from
obtaining complete relief. Likewise, because the SBA authorized Capital to sue on the note and
the guaranties, the absence of the SBA does not prevent the guarantors from obtaining complete
relief. Capital was authorized to stand in the place of the SBA, and the guarantors were entitled
to assert any claims or defenses they would have been able to assert against the SBA. Joining the
SBA as a party would be redundant.
Landes asserts that the failure to join the SBA at the trial court level deprived him of the
opportunity to assert certain defenses against the unsecured 90 percent portion of the loan held
by the SBA and caused him to suffer collateral damages. This argument fails for two reasons.
First, the substance of Landes' argument is that the unsecured portion of the claim, held
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originally by the SBA, should be treated differently with respect to the property that secured the
note. In regard to this argument, joinder of the SBA does not help Landes because, as mentioned
above, the SBA has authorized Capital to sue on the note and guaranties and, in effect, to
represent the SBA's interest in the case. Merely adding the SBA would not change the underlying
action, regardless of whether the unsecured portion of the note was treated differently.
Second, Landes has failed to articulate before the trial court, the court of appeals, or this court
what specific defenses he may have to the SBA claim. He has similarly failed to specify any
collateral damages he has suffered by reason of the SBA's absence. Thus, we have no grounds for
saying that the guarantors cannot obtain complete relief in the absence of the SBA, and we
therefore cannot find the SBA necessary under the rule 19(a)(1) test.
We next address rule 19(a)(2) to determine whether the SBA is a necessary party because it
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of
the matter in [its] absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede [its] ability to protect
that interest or (ii) leave [either Capital or the guarantors] subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of [its] claimed interest.
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2). With regard to the subpart (i) issue, SBA has authorized Capital to
represent the SBA's interest in this matter. Furthermore, SBA has not complained about the
nonjoinder, but rather has supported Capital in pursuing this action. Thus, we cannot say that the
SBA is situated such that the disposition of the matter in the absence of the SBA might impair or
impede the SBA's ability to protect its interest.
Under the subpart (ii) analysis, we likewise detect no danger of multiple or otherwise
inconsistent judgments. The absence of the SBA does not subject Capital to a risk of multiple
litigation. Similarly, the guarantors are not subject to a risk of multiple or inconsistent
obligations because the SBA has authorized Capital to sue on the note and guaranties and thus to
represent SBA's interest before the trial court. The trial court granted Capital a judgment based
on the entire outstanding balance of the note; regardless of whether the guarantors might have
independent defenses or claims against the SBA, the SBA could have no remaining cause of
action against the guarantors once the underlying note was satisfied.
For these reasons, we find that the SBA was not a necessary party under rule 19(a). We
therefore need not address the issue of whether joinder was feasible.
We next address the issue of indispensability. Only if a party is found necessary under the
rule 19(a) analysis and the party cannot feasibly be joined does a court need to analyze
indispensability under rule 19(b).4 Because the SBA is not a necessary party, there is no reason
for us to address the issue of indispensability.
As the foregoing demonstrates, the court of appeals correctly held that the trial court erred in
failing to explain its reasons for concluding that the SBA was indispensable. The court of appeals
erred in its analysis, however, because it addressed the issue of indispensability without first
addressing the necessary party issue. The issue of indispensability does not arise unless the court
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determines, first, that the party is necessary and second, that the party cannot feasibly be joined.
Finally, we note that if Landes had been concerned about the absence of the SB A, he could
have included the SBA as a defendant in the original complaint or he could have requested leave
to amend under rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to add the SBA as a defendant. Rule
15 expressly favors amendment, stating that "leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice
so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). Having himself failed to join the SBA, Landes cannot now
complain that the court's failure to require joinder of the SBA is reversible error. See
Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel, 713 P.2d 55, 60 (Utah 1986).
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the SBA was not a necessary party. The
decision of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed.
OPINION FOOTNOTES
1 The Loan Restructure Agreement stated: Sidney Seftel and Michael Landes personally guarantee
the Bank's loan to the Borrower. Each is personally liable for the entire indebtedness to the Bank. Each
agrees to provide the Bank by February 28th of each year a current personal financial statement as
specified in the loan agreement dated December 24, 1979.
2. See, e.g., Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 166-67, 6 L. Ed. 289 (1825); Graf v.
Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 697 F.2d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1983); Jim Walter Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
625 F.2d 676, 681 (5th Cir. 1980); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 628 (2d Cir. 1976); Warner
v. First Natl Bank of Minneapolis, 236 F.2d 853, 857 (8th Cir), cert, denied, 352 U.S. 927, 77 S. Ct.
226, 1 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1956); Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 202 F.2d
944, 946 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 346 U.S. 899, 74 S. Ct. 225, 98 L. Ed. 400, (1953); Dyer v. Stauffer, 19
F.2d 922, 922 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 275 U.S. 551, 48 S. Ct. 114, 72 L. Ed. 421 (1927); Rippey v.
Denver U.S. Nat'l Bank, 42 F.R.D. 316, 318-19 (D. Colo. 1967).
3 In his affidavit, Mr. Allem stated:
5. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the SBA Participation Guaranty, Capital City is the holder of all loan
instruments, which in this case includes the note executed by Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., on
December 24, 1979,... and the Guaranty Agreements of even date executed by Sidney Seftel and Theresa
L. Seftel and Michael S. Landes... and until those instruments are transferred to SBA, Capital City is
entitled to sue upon the loan instruments including acceleration of the maturity of the note and guaranties
provided Capital City has obtained the written consent of SBA.
6. Capital City is the legal holder of the note and guaranties involved in this action, and Capital City
has not transferred the note or guaranties to SBA and has been authorized in writing by SBA to sue upon
the note and guaranties and accelerate the maturity thereof.
4 Rule 19(b) analysis involves questions of equity and therefore is committed to the discretion of the
court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b) (court to "determine whether in equity and good conscience the action
should proceed among the parties before it"); see also 7 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, §§ 1607, 1611.
The analysis is basically a balancing of the inequities that would result from proceeding without the
nonjoined party, specifically including the four factors of rule 19(b). Based on these factors, a trial court
has the discretion to proceed without the party or to dismiss the action for failure to join an indispensable
party. See Bonneville Tower Condominiums Management Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assocs.,
728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1988).
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stention can be applied to "state administrative proceedings in which important
state interests are vindicated, so long as in
the course of those proceedings, the federal
plaintiff would have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim "
Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 106 S Ct
at 2723. We thus must answer three relevant questions: (1) whether the state proceedings "constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding;" (2) whether the proceedings "implicate important state interests,"
and (3) whether there is "an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise
constitutional challenges," Middlesex, 457
U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521.

trary, the district court's decision to abstain could be grounded on Younger3
For the above reasons, we conclude that
the district court's decision to abstain on
the instant facts was a proper exercise of
discretion. Given the above, our initial
opinion reversing the district court is withdrawn in part, and the order of the district
court dismissing NOPSFs claim is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith

Turning our attention to these inquiries,
we find that the administrative proceeding
before the Council constitutes an ongoing
judicial proceeding under Middlesex and
Ohio Civil Rights Commission, as it is
appealable to the Civil District Court for
the Parish of Orleans, and is thus "within
the appellate jurisdiction" of the Louisiana
courts. Ohio Civil Rights Commission,
106 S.Ct at 2723. The interest of the
Council of New Orleans in setting retail
rates is clearly important here: indeed, jurisdiction over retail rates is preserved to
the states by the terms of the Federal
Power Act. Finally, we find that through
the appellate process, NOPSI would have a
full and fair opportunity to litigate its federal claims. As in Ohio Civil Rights Commission, NOPSI cites no authority indicating that state review cannot be had of its
claims. 106 S.Ct at 2724. As there is no
"bad faith, harrassment or other exceptional circumstances" which dictate to the con-

Seller brought suit against buyer for
breach of contract to purchase working
interest in oil and gas leases. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Robert M. Parker, J., found
that seller had failed to deliver interest as
required by contract, and seller appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Jerre S. Williams,

3. In addition, the Council at the time NOPSI
sought injunctive relief from the district court
had not yet taken any definitive action on
NOPSI's Ma\ 17, 1985, rate increase application
Concerns of federalism lead us to treat challenges to anticipated state agency action "with
special skepticism " Wnght and Miller § 3532
6 In Public Service Commission of Utah v
Wycoff Co., 344 U S 237, 244, 73 S Ct 236, 241,
97 L Ed 291 (1952) the Supreme Court refused
to address the merits of a claim it described as
seeking a declaratory judgment for the purpose
of "guardfingj against the possibility that [the
local commission] would attempt to prevent re-

spondent from operating under its certificate
from the Interstate Commerce Commission"
(emphasis in original) The Court observed:
as the declaratory proceeding is here invoked,
it is even less appropriate because, m addition
to foreclosing an administrative body, it is
incompatible with a proper federal-state relationship The carrier, being in some disagreement with the State Commission, rushed into
federal court to get a declaration which either
is intended in ways not disclosed to tie the
Commission's hands before it can act or has
no purpose at all
Id at 247, 73 S Ct at 242
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Circuit Judge, held that fact that assignment of limited partnership's working interest lacked specific statement that trustee-in-bankruptcy for general partner held
power to convey limited partnership's interest did not render title unmarketable, and
assignment was sufficient under Texas law
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Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern Distrtict of Texas.
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DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
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JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
In this diversity case, the district court
held that appellee Marshall Exploration,
Inc (Marshall) was not in breach of a contract to purchase the working interest in oil
and gas leases from appellants Pride Exploration, Inc. and others (Pride) The
court found that Pride had failed to deliver
the interest as required by the contract.
Upon timely appeal by Pride, we reverse
and remand for a new trial.
Pride had agreed to deliver the full 100
percent of the working interest in certain
Texas oil and gas leases to Marshall in
exchange for $48,487.50. The leases were
known as the 'Winston Taylor leases."
The working interest in the leases was held
jointly by numerous parties, including the
Lexco 81-2 Drilling Program (Lexco) with
20.375 percent, Latham Exploration Company with 2 percent, and James Latham
with 2 percent. Marshall and Pride agreed
that one working interest owner, E.S.
Boase, would secure assignments from the
other owners and would then convey the
entire interest to Marshall.
This case arose as a result of Marshall's
refusal to accept the leases and to pay the
purchase price for them. Pride brought a
suit for breach of contract seeking damages of $48,487.50. The district court held
that a contract between the parties existed,
but that Marshall had justifiably refused to
perform because Pnde had failed to deliver
the required 100 percent of the working
interest. The district court's holding was
based upon a finding that as part of the
collecting of the 100 percent interest a proported assignment of Lexco's working interest to Boase was not adequate to convey
marketable title ] The court made its ml-

1. The judge issued an ora! finding from the
bench There was no statement as to the specif-

IC defect or defects he found in Lexco's assignment

1. Mines and Minerals <s=*99(3)
Fact that general partner was erroneously identified as party transferring working interest in oil and gas leases on limited
partnership's behalf was merely surplusage, and did not affect validity of assignment
2. Bankruptcy <^>676
Trustee-in-bankruptcy of program operator and general partner was proper party to transfer limited partnership's mterest
in lease. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 363(cXD.
3. Mines and Minerals e=>74(3)
Fact that assignment of limited partnership's working interest in oil and gas
leases lacked specific statement that trustee-in-bankruptcy for general partner held
power to convey limited partnership's interest did not render title unmarketable, and
assignment was sufficient under Texas law
to transfer partnership's working interest
4. Deeds <s=>95
Technical words and phrases are not
controlling in deeds.
5. Deeds <^26, 45, 47
If grantor and grantee can be determined from whole of instrument, and document is signed and acknowledged by
grantor, then document accomplishes legally effective conveyance.
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ing in the middle of the trial, determining
that no further testimony was necessary
once the Lexco assignment was declared
invalid. On appeal to this Court, Pride
urges that the district court erred in holding that the Lexco assignment did not
transfer marketable title under Texas law.
Lexco is a limited partnership of which
Latham Exploration and James Latham are
general partners. The partnership agreement provided that Lexco's property could
be conveyed solely by the "program operator." At all relevant times, Latham Exploration was Lexco's designated program operator and was in bankruptcy. William
Sandoz was the trustee-in-bankruptcy of
Latham Exploration.
The assignment at issue, Appendix A,
showed "Lexco by James A. Latham, General Partner" as the grantor of the working interest. The instrument contained
Lexco's signature "by James A. Latham,
General Partner, and INDIVIDUALLY."
Additionally, Latham Exploration's name
was typed below James Latham's signature
and was signed by Sandoz. Nothing in the
instrument indicated that Latham Exploration was signing in its capacity as Lexco's
program operator, or in any other way
specifically connected Latham Exploration
with Lexco.
[1] Appellee claims two defects in the
Lexco assignment. First, the granting
clause named "Lexco by James A. Latham,
General Partner" as the assignor. As both
parties agree, James Latham had no authority under the limited partnership agreement to convey Lexco's interest because he
was not the "program operator." Lexco,
however, was properly named as the grantor. The fact that James Latham was erroneously identified as the party transferring
the interest on Lexco's behalf was merely
surplusage, and did not affect the validity
of the assignment. Terry v. Zaffran, 483
So.2d 526, 527 (Fla.App.1986).
2. As the trustee-in-bankruptcy of the program
operator, Sandoz was the proper party to transfer Lexco's interest in the lease. 11 U.S.C.

[2] Second, the document failed to recite that Sandoz, the trustee-in-bankruptcy
of Latham Exploration Company, was conveying Lexco's interest in his capacity as
Lexco's program operator.2 Ideally, the
signature line should have contained the
word "by" in front of Latham Exploration
Company's name and should have disclosed
the status of Latham Exploration as "program operator."
[3] Surprisingly, we have discovered
virtually no case law, including Texas
cases, dealing with the question of whether
a conveyance, properly naming the grantor
and signed by the proper party, is nevertheless invalid because the signer failed to
indicate the capacity in which he signed.
Our review of the few applicable cases
convinces us that it did not render the title
unmarketable for the document to lack a
specific statement that Sandoz as trusteein-bankruptcy for Latham Exploration
Company held the power to convey the
Lexco interest.
[4,5] Technical words and phrases are
not controlling in deeds. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Exxon Corp., 663 S.W.2d 858,
867 (Tex.App.—Houston 1983), affd 678
S.W.2d 944 (Tex.1984). If a grantor and
grantee can be determined from the whole
of the instrument, and the document is
signed and acknowledged by the grantor,
then the document accomplishes a legally
effective conveyance. Id. The cases
found indicate that failure of a signer of a
real estate conveyance to indicate the capacity in which he is signing the document
does not render the title unmarketable.
Ford v. Warner, 176 S.W. 885, 888 (Tex.
Civ App.1915); Odell v. Kennedy, 26 Tex.
Civ.App. 439, 64 S.W. 802 (1901, writ ref d);
Bennett v. Virginia Ranch & Cattle Co., 1
Tex.Civ.App. 321, 21 S.W. 126, 128 (1892).
The rule was stated by a Kentucky court in
the context of a corporate real estate conveyance as follows: "Regardless of the
form of the signature, the body must show
that it is the act of the corporation. This
§ 363(c)(1). Marshall does not dispute the authority of Sandoz to transfer the working interest.
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The district court ruled for Marshall in
done, it is sufficient if it is signed by the
proper officer or officers, with or without the middle of the tnal when it determined
the name of the office held by the signer " that no further testimony was necessary
Chnsttan v. Johnson, 556 S.W 2d 172, 173 because Lexco's assignment was invalid.
(Ky.Ct.App. 1977) Marshall has cited no Marshall asserts that it had additional deauthority for the proposition that a failure fenses to this action which were never
to identify Latham Exploration as Lexco's presented because of the truncated nature
"program operator" on the document pre of the proceedings In view of our holding
vented a transfer of marketable title3 We that the Lexco assignment was effective,
hold that the assignment at issue was sufficient under Texas law to transfer Lexco's we remand for a new tnal.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
working interest to Boase
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James A Latham, General P a r t n e r
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celled "Seeject 1
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aW 1 U M M I , far the consideration of 0>E •OWHED OOLLttS ($100.00)
end ether good, nalnahle end adequate consideration, the receipt of which l a
i herehy echaovlsftgel hy Aeelgnor, the eaid Assignor does herehy g n a t , targala,
• a l l and convey a l l at hie rights» t i t l e ami l n t e r e e t l a the Subject I M M I
hereinafter doscrihod to I . S. BOaft. « U « n a i l i n g eddraea i s Peat Office l e a
S3,

Carthage. Tnmee 75*33, hereinafter called "Aaalgpee".

(1)
Detet
lecorded*

(2)

Lesaer
Leaaee*
Dace.
Bocerded.

Vlaataa Taylor at ux
t, S. Bane*
August 27. 1901
Value* 946, Pag* **'
Deed Becerda of Barrieon County, T«x.
Travis Peak loyalty
1. S. Baeec

Corp.

Septeuner 21, 19S1
Valiant 944, Page 292
Dead Records of Rarrleoo Conor?, Te*

TVs Assignor unfcea no warranty regardiag the t i t l e t o the assigned
premises either in lav or equity, except that Assignor warrants against anyone
aaaertlag aa eduerec d a l e of t i t l e te the Subject Ltases that arises hy,
through, or under any act of Assignor, hut t h i s Assignment i s node with trans-

. Many cases indicate that when a signer is not
named in the granting clause, he is not bound
by the conveyance For example, in Young \
Magee, 196 SW.2d 203 (Tex Civ App —Texar
kana), aff'd 145 Tex 485, 198 S W 2d 883 (1946),
a husband and wife attempted to convey proper
ty owned jointly, and both signed the deed The
husband, however, was not named as grantor
The court held the document ineffective as a

conveyance Id at 205 These cases are inapposite to the present case, because Lexco was
properly named as grantor See Creosoted
Wood Block Paving Company v McKay, 211
SW 822 (Tex Civ .App— Dallas 1919) (deed
naming as grantors "McKav and wife" was ef
fective to convey wifes interest even though she
was not designated by name in granting clause)
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by James A. Lathaw, General
and INDIVIDUALLY
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Lathait Exploration Coaptny, Inc.
in Bankruptcy J>y Wi^ia» C.^anjJrS*,
Truste "" ^
"*
by:

'TJ^O

James W. ROBERTSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ALEXANDER GRANT & COMPANY,
etc., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 85-1542.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Sept. 2, 1986.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
Denied Sept. 30, 1986.
Former partner of accounting firm
sued the firm and two of its partners, alleging that firm's refusal to pay him retirement benefits violated ERISA. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Robert W. Porter, J., entered summary judgment for defendants,
and former partner appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Robert Madden Hill, Circuit
Judge, held that ERISA did not apply to
retirement plan which covered only partners.
Affirmed.
1. Pensions <s=>28
ERISA did not apply to retirement
plan which covered only partners. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
§§ 101, 201, 301, 401, 505, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1021, 1051, 1081, 1101, 1135.
* District Judge of the Eastern District of Louisi-

2. Pensions e=>28
Partnership's partners' retirement plan
and principals' retirement plan were separate plans, for purpose of determining applicability of ERISA to partners' plan, even
though the plans were nearly identical,
where plan covering partners did not pay
any benefits to principals and plan covering
principals did not pay any benefits to partners. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 101, 201, 301, 401, 505,
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021,1051,1081,1101,1135.
William D. Harris, Jr., Richards, Harris,
Medlock & Andrews, Daniel V. Thompson,
Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.
G.R. Poehner, Morre & Peterson, William
*\ LePage, Dallas, Tex., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before GARWOOD and ROBERT MADDEN HILL, Circuit Judges, and MARTIN
L.C. FELDMAN % District Judge.
ROBERT MADDEN HILL, Circuit
Judge:
We hold today that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, is inapplicable to retirement plans covering only partners and,
accordingly, affirm the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.
ana, sitting by designation.
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Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant.
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with
whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party
authorized by statute may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit
the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another
shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that
it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been
allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have
the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent person who is a
party must appear either by a general guardian or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the
particular case by the court in which the action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed
in any case when it is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted
expedient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the action or proceeding,
notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian and may have appeared by the
guardian. In an action in rem it shall not be necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any
unknown party who might be a minor or an incompetent person.
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by a court must be
appointed as follows:
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if the minor is of the age
of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor.
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if the minor is of the age
of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after the service of the summons, or if under that age
or if the minor neglects so to apply, then upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor,
or of any other party to the action.
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon motion therefor, shall
be entitled to an order designating some suitable person to be guardian ad litem for the minor
defendant, unless the defendant or someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after
service of notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such minor. Service of
such notice may be made upon the defendant's general or testamentary guardian located in the
defendant's state; if there is none, such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be
served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon such minor, if over fourteen
years of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by such service on the person with whom the
minor resides. The guardian ad litem for such nonresident minor defendant shall have 20 days
after appointment in which to plead to the action.
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or proceeding, upon the
application of a relative or friend of such insane or incompetent person, or of any other party to
the action or proceeding.
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or more persons associated
in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other association, not a
corporation, transact such business under a common name, whether it comprises the names of
(c)1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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such associates or not, they may sue or be sued by such common name. Any judgment obtained
against the association shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the same manner as if
all had been named parties and had been sued upon their joint liability. The separate property of
an individual member of the association may not be bound by the judgment unless the member is
named as a party and the court acquires jurisdiction over the member.
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a nonresident person is
associated in and conducts business within the state of Utah in one or more places in that person's
own name or a common trade name, and the business is conducted under the supervision of a
manager, superintendent or agent the person may be sued in the person's name in any action
arising out of the conduct of the business.
(f) As used in these rules, the term plaintiff shall include a petitioner, and the term defendant
shall include a respondent.
History: Amended effective September 1,1991; April 1,1998.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Paragraph (d) has been changed to conform to the holding in Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d
499 (Utah 1988), which allows an unincorporated association to sue in its own name. The rule continues
to allow an unincorporated association to be sued in its own name. The final sentence of paragraph (d)
was added to confirm that the separate property of an individual member of an association may not be
bound by the judgment unless the member is made a party.
Technical changes in all paragraphs of the rule make the terminology gender neutral. In part (c) the
word "minor" has replaced the word "infant," in order to maintain consistency with recent changes made in
Rule 4(e)(2). In Rule 4 an infant is defined as a person under the age of 14 years, whereas the intent of
Rule 17(c) is to include persons under the age of 18 years.
Amendment Notes. - The 1998 amendment added Subdivision (f).
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 17, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. - Guardians, § 75-5-101 et seq.
Service of process, U.R.C.P. 4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis
Associates.
- Joint venture.
Common name.
Minors.
- Action for injury of minor.
- Control by court.
- Failure to comply.
-- Relief from judgment.
Nonresident doing business in state.
(c)1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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- Not found.
Real party in interest.
- Assignee.
- Corporation.
~ Assignment of assets to another corporation.
- Foreign corporation.
-- Shareholder.
- Divorce cases.
- Insurance company.
- Joint tort-feasors.
- Partner in joint venture.
- Purpose of rule.
- Trust beneficiary.
- Wife.
- Wrongful death action.
Cited.
Associates.
- Joint venture.
Joint venturers may sue in the name of the joint venture. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499
(Utah 1988).
Common name.
Banks that continued to run a shopping center after foreclosing on a loan to the developer could not
be sued under the name of the shopping center, as the banks did not transact business or hold
themselves out to the public under that name. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995), affd, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996).
The name of a building owned by parties transacting business together, even if the business
transactions related solely to the building, is not enough to establish that the parties were transacting
business under the name of the building for purposes of this rule. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923
P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996) (affg 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)).
Although the two defendant banks transacted business together, including assuming title to property
and entering leases with various tenants for portions of the property, where there was no evidence to
show that the parties transacted business under the name accorded to their property, the "common name"
provision in this rule did not apply. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996) (affg 895
P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)).
Minors.
- Action for injury of minor.
Under this rule, mother as guardian ad litem for benefit of father could bring action for injuries to
sixteen-year-old son where father, an immigrant, had a somewhat limited use of English and business
matters were mainly handled by the mother; § 78-11-6 providing for suit by father was not exclusive
remedy. Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, 484 P.2d 1177 (1971).
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- Control by court.
A guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to Subdivision (b) is subject to the control of the court
Skollingsberg v Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, 484 P 2d 1177 (1971)
- Failure to comply.
- Relief from judgment.
The plea of infancy is a personal privilege which may be waived and, without a showing of fraud,
collusion, or other substantial error going to the merits of the case, a minor defendant is not entitled to be
relieved of the judgment against her on the basis of infancy Whitney v Walker, 25 Utah 2d 202, 479 P 2d
469(1971)
Nonresident doing business in state.
- Not found.
A nonresident who enters into contracts with entertainers who agree to perform at Utah schools in
accordance with schedules arranged by him, and to collect for the performances, is not conducting
business in Utah, either himself or through the entertainers, within meaning of this rule Alward v Green,
122 Utah 35, 245 P 2d 855 (1952)
Real party in interest.
- Assignee.
An assignee is the real party in interest Lynch v MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P 2d 464 (1962)
- Corporation.
-- Assignment of assets to another corporation.
In action for alleged breach of loan agreement, dismissal of action on ground that plaintiff corporation
was not real party in interest was error, since plaintiff corporation's assignment of all right, title and interest
to all of its assets and unliquidated claims to another corporation did not include assignment of instant
cause of action M & S Constr & Eng'g Co v Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah 2d 139, 467 P 2d 410
(1970)
- Foreign corporation.
The owner of a business is not precluded from enforcing a covenant not to compete merely because
foreign corporation, disqualified from suing, may also have an interest in the contract and may incidentally
derive an indirect benefit from the enforcement of the owner's rights Shaw v Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 239
P 2d 745 (1952)
-- Shareholder.
Even though a shareholder owns all, or practically all, of the stock in a corporation, such a fact does
not authorize him to sue as an individual for a wrong done by a third party to the corporation Norman v
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co , 596 P 2d 1028 (Utah 1979)
- Divorce cases.
Attorney's attempt to alter a divorce decree to provide that attorney's fees be paid directly to him was
not a permissible procedure McDonald v McDonald, 866 P 2d 1253 (Utah Ct App 1993)
(c)1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc , and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc All Rights Reserved

5
- Insurance company.
Where purchaser of real estate was reimbursed by title insurance company for flaw in vendor's title,
only insurance company, and not purchaser, was real party in interest entitled to bring action against
vendor. Haueter v. Peguillan, 586 P.2d 403 (Utah 1978).
- Joint tort-feasors.
Joint tort-feasors, where liability is joint and severable, are neither indispensable nor necessary
parties. Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P.2d 464 (1962).
- Partner in joint venture.
In suit by partner in a joint venture against potential investors in the venture for interference with
contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of agreement, the partner was
required to either name the partnership as party in interest or join his partner as an indispensable party in
interest. Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984).
- Purpose of rule.
A defendant has the right to have a cause of action prosecuted by the real party in interest so that the
judgment will preclude any action on the same demand by another, and so that the defendant will be
permitted to assert all defenses or counterclaims available against the real owner of the cause. Shaw v.
Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 745 (1952).
- Trust beneficiary.
Although this rule clearly allows the trustee to sue on behalf of the beneficiary, it does not prevent the
beneficiary from suing third parties directly. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 P.2d 742 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
A trust beneficiary has standing to bring suit against third parties for the improper distribution of stock
in the trust if he or she can show that the trustee improperly refused or neglected to bring an action
against the third parties. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 P.2d 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert,
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
- Wife.
Where the husband sued to set aside a fraudulent transaction in which he had loaned $5000 to the
defendant's corporation from funds in his business account in exchange for a note payable to husband
and wife jointly, the wife was not an indispensable party plaintiff even though she replenished her
husband's business account with their joint savings, since the false representations were made only to the
husband and the wife took no other part in the transaction. Greenwell v. Duvall, 9 Utah 2d 89, 338 P.2d
118(1959).
- Wrongful death action.
Because decedent's estate had no capacity to bring an action for wrongful death, the complaint was a
nullity and there remained no cause of action in which to substitute parties; therefore, the trial court did not
err in denying plaintiffs motion to substitute real parties in interest. Estate of Haro v. Haro, 887 P.2d 878
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Cited in Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984); Intermountain
Physical Medicine Assocs. v. Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Empire Land Title,
Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Mtg. Co., 797 P.2d 467 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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State Consumer Protection Act, right to private action under, 62 A.L.R.3d 169.
Who is minor's next of kin for guardianship purposes, 63 A.L.R.3d 813.
Bailor's right of direct action against bailee's theft insurer for loss of bailed property, 64 A.L.R.3d 1207.
Proper party plaintiff in action for injury to common areas of condominium development, 69 A.L.R.3d
1148.
Necessary or proper parties to suit or proceeding to establish private boundary line, 73 A.L.R.3d 948.
Necessity of requiring presence in court of both parties in proceedings relating to custody or visitation
of children, 15 A.LR.4th 864.
Right of illegitimate child to maintain action to determine paternity, 19 A.L.R.4th 1082.
Required parties in adoption proceedings, 48 A.L.R.4th 860.
Joint venture's capacity to sue, 56 A.L.R.4th 1234.
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